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CHILDREN’S RIGHTS AND A CAPABILITIES
APPROACH: THE QUESTION OF
SPECIAL PRIORITY
Rosalind Dixon † & Martha C. Nussbaum ††
The latter part of the twentieth century saw the near-universal recognition of the idea of children’s rights as human rights. At the same time, the
conceptual basis for such rights remains largely under-theorized. Part of the
aim of this Article is to draw on the insights of the “capabilities approach”
developed by Martha Nussbaum in philosophy, and Amartya Sen in economics, in order to provide a fuller theoretical justification of this kind. In addition, this Article investigates the degree to which it will be justifiable, under
such an approach, for international human rights law or national constitutions, to give special priority to children’s rights. It begins this task by first
considering, and rejecting, potential justifications for such special priority
based on the need to ensure the future self-reliance of children as adults and
ideas about the special “innocence” of children; and, then, by developing two
affirmative justifications for such special priority, based on the special vulnerability of children, and the special cost-effectiveness of protecting children’s rights. This Article also explores the degree to which these principles
may provide a starting point for thinking about more general trade-offs between different rights claims, or claimants, under a capabilities approach.
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INTRODUCTION
A defining feature of the last century was the progressive expansion of rights to “people once ignored or excluded” by the law.1 A
major milestone, in that process, was also the recognition in both international human rights (IHR) law and various national constitutions
of the rights of children.
For much of the nineteenth century, children had few if any independent legal rights, let alone rights under international or constitutional law.2 This position was first challenged by leading
enlightenment thinkers in the eighteenth century,3 and then at an
international level in the early twentieth century, with the adoption by
the League of Nations of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child.4
The movement for change gained further momentum in 1959, with
the adoption by the U.N. General Assembly of a nonbinding declaration on children’s rights,5 and in 1966, with the adoption of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR).6 The shift, however, was arguably only fully complete following the widespread adoption in 1989 of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CROC).7
1
See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557 (1996) (noting that “[a] prime
part” of the United States’ constitutional history is the “story of the extension of constitutional rights and protections to people once ignored or excluded” (footnote and internal
citation omitted)).
2
See, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Changing Status of the Child, in THE U.N.
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: AN ANALYSIS OF TREATY PROVISIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. RATIFICATION 51, 52 (Jonathan Todres et al. eds., 2006) (explaining that
nineteenth-century children were “subject to virtually unlimited parental authority” and
that children’s legal rights were “the mirror image of parental obligations”).
3
See, e.g., 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 28–29 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., Liberty Fund 1981) (1776)
(stressing the importance of early education); see also infra notes 67–69 and accompanying
text. For later thinkers in this same tradition, see Martha C. Nussbaum, Foreword, Constitutions and Capabilities: “Perception” Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8, 55 (2007)
[hereinafter Nussbaum, Constitutions and Capabilities] (discussing the British political philosopher T.H. Green who supported various social legislation initiatives, including bills for
free compulsory education); Diane P. Wood, Constitutions and Capabilities: A (Necessarily)
Pragmatic Approach, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 415, 415 (2010) (exploring Nussbaum’s view that “a
society’s constitution ought to include provisions designed to develop human capabilities”).
4
Declaration of Geneva, League of Nations Doc A.107 1924 IV (1924).
5
See A. GLENN MOWER, JR., THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPORT FOR CHILDREN 13 (1997).
6
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, S. TREATY. DOC.
No. 95-20 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY DOC. No. 95-19 (1978), 993
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
7
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
CROC]; see also David Weissbrodt, Prospects for Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 209, 209–10 (2006) (noting that CROC is the most quickly
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A similar pattern has emerged in many countries at a national
constitutional level. In countries such as the United States and India,
recognition of the rights of (equal) access to primary education for
children began as early as the 1950s.8 In other countries, such as
Honduras, Colombia, South Africa, and Brazil, more recent constitutions have included a range of express rights protections for children,
including rights of access to education, basic nutrition, shelter, health
(or health care services), social services, and social security; recreation
(or sport); a name and a nationality from birth; and protection from
maltreatment, neglect, abuse, degradation, exploitative labor practices, or other inappropriate or dangerous forms of work.9
At the same time, developing a theoretical basis for this increasing recognition of children’s rights remains a work in progress.10
ratified human rights treaty to date and that since then “children’s rights have come to the
forefront of human rights”).
8
See, e.g., INDIA CONST. art. 41 (“The State shall, within the limits of its economic
capacity and development, make effective provision for securing the right
to . . . education . . . .”); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (noting that where
a state or local government has chosen to provide education, it “is a right which must be
made available to all on equal terms”). India’s constitution came into force on January 26,
1950. Vijayashri Sripati, Toward Fifty Years of Constitutionalism and Fundamental Rights in India: Looking Back to See Ahead (1950–2000), 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 413, 416 n.7 (1998). For
even earlier recognition of the right, see IR. CONST., 1937, art. 42 (requiring the state to
provide for free primary education and to require that “children receive a certain minimum education, moral, intellectual and social”).
9
CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 227 (Braz.) (calling it a familial,
societal, and governmental duty to provide children with health and education and protect
them from discrimination and violence); CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art.
42 (stating that children born outside of a marriage, conceived with scientific assistance, or
adopted have the same rights and duties as children born within a marriage or conceived
naturally); CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE HONDURAS, 1982, ch. IV, arts.
119–26 (detailing the rights of children); S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 28(1) (listing the rights of
children, including the right to a name and a nationality). Other constitutions provide
similar protection by implicit incorporation of CROC. See, e.g., E. TIMOR CONST., 2002,
§ 18(2) (stating that children shall enjoy all rights “enshrined in international conventions
commonly ratified . . . by the State”). East Timor has ratified CROC. See CHILD RIGHTS
COALITION ASIA, http://www.childrightscoalitionasia.org/southeast-asia/east-timor (last
visited Nov. 13, 2011) (listing international human rights instruments ratified by East Timor). See further discussion in AOIFE NOLAN, CHILDREN’S SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND THE COURTS, at xxix–xxx (2011) [hereinafter NOLAN, CHILDREN’S SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS]; Aoife Nolan, The Child’s Right to Health and the Courts, in GLOBAL
HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 135, 142–44 (John
Harrington & Maria Stuttaford eds., 2010) [hereinafter Nolan, The Child’s Right to Health].
10
See Martha Minow, What Ever Happened to Children’s Rights?, 80 MINN. L. REV. 267,
287, 295–97 (1995) (noting progress in the international domain in recognizing human
dignity as the starting point for children’s rights, but also the degree to which the “movement for children’s rights [has] failed to secure a coherent . . . intellectual foundation”).
For more recent work, which begins to flesh out a dignity-based account with clear similarities to our own, see Michael D.A. Freeman, Upholding the Dignity and Best Interests of Children:
International Law and the Corporal Punishment of Children, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 211,
251 (2010) (arguing that “[t]o emphasize dignity is to engage with our conception of what
it is to be human” and that it is now time to “recognize dignity’s significance for children

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\97-3\CRN303.txt

552

unknown

Seq: 4

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

9-MAR-12

13:52

[Vol. 97:549

Many existing accounts of children’s rights, for example, depend on a
theory of children as “adult-like,” or quasi-adults, entitled to the same
rights and entitlements as adults under a social contract approach.11
Both CROC and many national constitutions, however, clearly recognize even very young children as enjoying various rights.12 Both IHR
and many constitutions also omit certain key rights belonging to
adults in the social contract tradition, such as the right to vote.13
While other theories focus more directly on the special needs and attributes of children, they also do so in a way that often fails to connect
these special needs with an emphasis on children’s agency.14
Part of the aim of this Article, therefore, is to provide a more fully
developed theoretical account of children’s rights, by drawing on the
insights of the capabilities approach (CA) developed by Martha Nussbaum in philosophy and Amartya Sen in economics.15 A CA, this Article argues, provides a clear account for why children’s rights should
be recognized as human rights, because every human being, under

and for the corporal-punishment debate”); cf. DAVID ARCHARD, CHILDREN 160–70 (1993)
(offering another alternative theory of children’s rights, distinct from social contract ideas,
based on notions of equality, democracy and “modest collectivism”).
11
See Minow, supra note 10, at 275 (“Advocates for children use the rhetoric of
rights . . . to place children in the same legal position as adults . . . .”).
12
See, e.g., CROC, supra note 7, at arts. 12–15, 24–28 (describing a child’s right to
freedom of thought and expression as well as a right to receive health and social services);
supra note 9 and accompanying text.
13
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. But see Minow, supra note 10, at 271 (describing John Holt’s urging that children be given equal treatment under law, including the
right to vote); see also Aoife Nolan, The Child as “Democratic Citizen”: Challenging the “Participation Gap,” 2010 PUB. L. 767, 768 (describing the lack of protection afforded to children’s
democratic participation as “deeply problematic”). One possible solution to protecting
children’s participatory rights would be amending the “franchise to introduce a weighted
voting system, under which children are accorded a share of an adult vote which increases
over time proportionate to the child’s age.” Id. at 777.
14
See, e.g., Martha Minow, Are Rights Right for Children?, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
203, 211 (reasoning that procedural solutions help children receive attention and “recognition of their distinct needs by those who have power over them”).
15
See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY,
SPECIES MEMBERSHIP (2006) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS] (explaining that CA is a
useful framework for exploring issues of social justice); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH (2000) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, WOMEN
AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT] (arguing that the best way to provide the basic social minimum
that human dignity requires is to focus on each person’s capabilities); Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice, 9 FEMINIST ECON. 33
(2003) [hereinafter Nussbaum, Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements] (discussing the relationship between Nussbaum’s version of the approach and that of Amartya Sen); Nussbaum, Constitutions and Capabilities, supra note 3 (describing CA as entrenched in many
parts of United States history and constitutional tradition). The entire related group of
theories (including Nussbaum’s and Sen’s) is discussed in MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING
CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH (2011) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES].
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this approach, is entitled to respect for her full human dignity.16 Like
other emerging theories based on the idea of human dignity,17 a CA
also helps explain, in this context, why it makes sense for both CROC
and various national constitutions to recognize a range of rights for
children with sensitivity both to children’s welfare needs and to children’s agency.
Compared to theories in the social contract tradition, a CA also
does better, we suggest, in accounting for the extension of rights to
young children, and the denial of various rights to older children. By
emphasizing the centrality of early childhood to the realization of a
range of human capabilities, for example, a CA helps affirm the status
of even very young as rights-bearers. At the same time, by emphasizing the idea of human dignity as a touchstone for IHR and constitutional law, a CA also helps ground children’s rights in a way that
potentially justifies limits on children’s political rights, such as the
right to vote, in some national and historical contexts. For these reasons, although theories of the social contract remain extremely valuable and give us deep insight into justice, we argue those interested in
theorizing the entitlements of children should prefer the CA.
The account of children’s rights provided by a CA, in this context, has important similarities with that provided by Nussbaum in
support of the rights of persons with intellectual disabilities.18 At
base, the argument for recognizing both sets of rights rests on a very
simple idea about the moral claim of all human beings to be afforded
full human dignity, regardless of their capacity for rational or reasoned participation in public or civic life. In both cases, the recognition of such rights can also imply a corresponding duty on the part of
the state to provide extensive forms of affirmative protection for
individuals.
At the same time, this Article suggests, in certain contexts both
CROC and various national constitutions also give special priority to
the so-called “welfare” or “socioeconomic” rights of children over
those of other groups in society in a way that seems far less easy to
16
This also accords with the basis given for recognizing children’s rights under instruments such as CROC. See, e.g., CROC, supra note 7, pmbl. (“Bearing in mind that the peoples of the United Nations have, in the Charter, reaffirmed their faith in fundamental
human rights and in the dignity and worth of the human person, and have determined to
promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom . . . .”).
17
See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 10, at 251 (stressing the importance of emphasizing
human dignity).
18
See NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS, supra note 15, at chs. 2–3; Martha Nussbaum, The Capabilities of People with Cognitive Disabilities, in COGNITIVE DISABILITY AND ITS CHALLENGE TO
MORAL PHILOSOPHY 74, 79 (Eva Feder Kittay & Licia Carlson eds., 2010) [hereinafter Nussbaum, The Capabilities of Persons with Cognitive Disabilities] (arguing that “it is the equal dignity” of human beings that demands recognition).
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justify from the perspective of a CA.19 A CA certainly recognizes the
potential for different kinds of rights to conflict, and thus also the
need to impose limits on some individual rights in order to protect
the rights of others.20 This also explains why a CA sanctions the idea
of imposing limits on parental rights and freedoms, in order to protect the future rights or capabilities of children.
Absent such direct conflict between the rights of children and
adults, however, a CA is generally committed to the equal protection
of rights for all up to a certain minimum threshold.21 Any trade-off
that leaves some people below this threshold will thus be a clear failure of basic justice under a CA, which should prompt a search for
long-term strategies that will bring all citizens above the threshold.
CROC and various national constitutions, however, clearly give at least
some degree of special priority to the realization of certain rights for
children, without in any way marking out this trade-off as “tragic.”22
A second key aim of this Article, therefore, is to provide a careful
examination of when, if ever, this kind of special priority to children’s
rights can be justified from the perspective of a CA. It identifies two
broad potential justifications for the grant of special priority to children’s rights in this context: first, where children are especially vulnerable as a result of their legal and economic dependence on adults, as
well as their inherent physical or emotional vulnerability (a “vulnerability principle”); and second, where the marginal cost of protecting
children’s rights is either so low that denying such a right would be a
direct affront to their dignity, or where it is far more cost-effective to
protect that right than an equivalent right for adults (a “cost-effectiveness principle”). By emphasizing the idea of spiraling capabilities
needs, this second principle in particular also draws on prior work by
Jonathan Wolff and Avner De-Shalit on notions of the “fertility” of
particular capabilities, or “corrosive disadvantage” caused by certain
capability failures.23
Neither of these principles of vulnerability or cost-effectiveness
can, of course, be applied without careful attention to the particular
national constitutional context. In every instance, the CA directs na19
For a thoughtful discussion of this issue more generally, see, for example, NOLAN,
CHILDREN’S SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 238–39.
20
See Nussbaum, Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements, supra note 15, at 44–46 (criticizing the absence of such a restriction in Sen’s account of capabilities); NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 15, at 71–74 (making the same argument).
21
For the concept of the threshold, see NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note
15, at 40–42 (arguing that the threshold expresses a minimum level for basic social justice
and that it ought to be set aspirationally, although not unrealistically).
22
See, e.g., CROC, supra note 7, at pmbl. (emphasizing that children are entitled to
special assistance).
23
JONATHAN WOLFF & AVNER DE-SHALIT, DISADVANTAGE 133–34 (2007) (exploring the
distinction between “fertility functioning” and “corrosive disadvantage”).
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tions to make its abstract entitlements concrete in accordance with
the nation’s situation and history.24 Furthermore, its model of implementation draws on bill of rights jurisprudence in U.S. constitutional
law, in which determinations of whether rights have been violated are
made in individual cases against an evolving background of (always
individual) precedents. In this tradition, highly abstract rights develop texture and specificity in an implementation process that extends over time, through confrontation with a wide range of
particular cases.25
Each principle also has important logical limits. A vulnerability
principle, for example, should be applied with careful attention to the
potential common economic and physical vulnerability of children
and adults, and to notions of what is reasonable to expect of parents
in particular societies. Considerations of cost, by contrast, should not
be allowed to obscure key differences between a CA and more utilitarian approaches, and thus should be applied with a close eye to notions of fertility and corrosiveness, and also limited to contexts in
which there are actual resource constraints. In other cases, this Article notes, a defining feature of the CA is that it insists that individuals,
such as those with severe cognitive disabilities, can legitimately expect
far less cost-sensitivity from the state when it comes to the realization
of their capabilities.26
Nonetheless, such principles do, we believe, provide a useful
starting point for thinking about why it may be permissible for the
state, in some cases, to give special priority to children, over adults,
when it comes to the enjoyment of some rights. They may also, we
suggest, provide a helpful starting point for thinking more broadly
about when it will be permissible for a state to make trade-offs among
different rights claims, or claimants, in a world of true resource scarcity. Proponents of a CA have to date approached this question by
emphasizing that we ought to support capabilities that will best promote a long-term future of full capabilities, given the particular social
and historical context.27 We flesh out this principle, however, by connecting it to notions of vulnerability, fertility, corrosiveness, and cost.
24

See Tom O’Neill & Dawn Zinga, Introduction to CHILDREN’S RIGHTS: MULTIDISCIPLIAPPROACHES TO PARTICIPATION AND PROTECTION 3–18 (Tom O’Neill & Dawn Zinga
eds., 2001) (noting similar benefits to domestic efforts at implementation of CROC).
25
See, e.g., Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct.
2308, 2340 (2009), (Souter, J., dissenting) (elaborating on one view of the process by
which courts in this tradition determine the “right moment . . . to decide whether substantive due process requires recognition of an individual right.”).
26
See infra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
27
See NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 15, at 36–39 (summarizing this
argument); Martha C. Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 169,
NARY
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This Article, thus, ultimately straddles two important debates: one
on the theoretical basis for children’s rights, and another on the justifiability of making certain trade-offs between rights in a world of resource scarcity. Both areas are ones in which there is a gap in existing
theory, and the place in which they intersect strikes us as a particularly
useful place in which to begin to think more carefully about each
question. There is, however, an obvious cost to this approach, namely
that we do not provide a full treatment of either the scope, or justifiability, of all children’s rights, or the question of trade-offs that are to
be made between different rights claims by adults. These are questions that we must leave to a later day.
This Article is divided into three parts. Following this Introduction, Part I provides a brief summary of a CA, including a discussion of
how it justifies the recognition of children’s rights as a distinct species
of human rights, and also does better in explaining the scope of such
rights than rival social contract approaches. Part II considers potential justifications for giving special priority to children’s rights, by first
considering and rejecting ideas about children’s innocence, and the
absolute priority of equal opportunity principles, and then developing
two affirmative justifications for giving special priority to children’s
rights based on considerations of vulnerability and cost-effectiveness.
Part III considers the range of potential extensions, and limitations,
on the logic of each of these two latter principles. This Article then
briefly concludes.

UNIVERSAL RIGHTS

I
& A CAPABILITIES APPROACH

The CA (also known as the “Human Development Approach”28)
was introduced as an alternative to growth-based models of development that equate improvement in the quality of life in a nation with
increased GDP per capita. Proponents of the CA argue that the
growth-based model is deficient in at least two ways: first, it neglects
distribution, and thus can give high marks to nations containing enormous inequalities.29 Second, it fails to disaggregate and separately
consider distinct aspects of a human life, such as health, education,
and political rights and liberties, which are not well correlated with
GDP.30 The basic idea behind the approach was summed up well by
169–200 (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2000) [hereinafter Nussbaum, The Costs
of Tragedy].
28
NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 15, at 17. Nussbaum prefers “Capabilities Approach” because she is concerned with the capabilities of nonhuman animals as
well as humans. For discussion, see generally NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS, supra note 15, at ch. 6.
29
NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 15, at 48–49.
30
Id. at 49. These are not the only arguments against the growth-based model. As
Nussbaum points out, “even if we were committed to measuring quality of life in narrowly
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economist Mahbub Ul Haq in the first of the Human Development
Reports of the United Nations Development Programme in 1990:
People are the real wealth of a nation. The basic objective of development is to create an enabling environment for people to enjoy
long, healthy and creative lives. This may appear to be a simple
truth. But it is often forgotten in the immediate concern with the
accumulation of commodities and financial wealth.31

In other words, rather than focusing simply on economic growth, development policy ought to focus on people’s real opportunities.
The CA begins, then, from a very simple question: What are people really able to do and to be? “Capabilities” are the answer to that
question: people’s real opportunities for functioning and choice.
(Sen calls capabilities “substantive freedoms.”32) Proponents of a CA
hold that each and every person matters: this is what Nussbaum has
called the “principle of each person as end.”33 In other words, it is not
enough to secure capabilities to a region, or a group, or even a family.
The approach asks how each and every person is doing, and its goal is
the empowerment of each. Children are no exception: all human beings possess equal and inalienable human dignity, whatever their attainments, talents, or potential, and all are equally entitled to all the
capabilities on the list.34
Some proponents of a CA use the concept of capabilities only
comparatively, refusing to endorse any definite set of norms. Nussbaum, however, has used the concept to develop a partial theory of
social justice, beginning from the idea of human dignity.35 In her approach, every person is held to possess full and equal human dignity—unless in a permanent vegetative condition or otherwise totally
monetary terms . . . it is far from clear that GDP per capita is the most interesting notion to
consider.” Id. at 48.
31
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1990, at
9.
32
See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 18 (1999) (“The success of a society is
to be evaluated . . . primarily by the substantive freedoms that members of that society enjoy.”
(emphasis added)).
33
See NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 15, at 35; NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 15, at 74.
34
Cf. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 15, at 31 (“But whereas there is
room to argue about whether innate potential differs across people, human dignity, from
the start, is equal in all who are agents in the first place . . . .”) (emphasis added).
35
It is important to stress in this context that the CA is not a theory of human nature:
it does not read off norms from the list of capacities that human beings actually have.
Indeed, some undoubted human capacities (for example, the capacity for cruelty) are bad
and should not be developed. Cf. id. at 28 (explaining that one would not describe as
“‘mutilated and deformed’ . . . a child whose capacity for cruelty . . . is starved and
thwarted by familial and social development . . . even if we granted that these capacities
have their basis in human nature”). The CA is thus evaluative, and asks which capabilities
that human beings may be able to attain are most relevant to the idea of a life worthy of
human dignity.
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and irrevocably cut off from striving and sentience.36 She then argues
that a life worthy of human dignity requires at least a minimum
threshold level of certain central capabilities, of which she tentatively
proposes a list.37 The list is emphatically a list of separate compo36

Id. at 29–31.
The Central Human Capabilities:
1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not
dying prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth
living.
2. Bodily health. Being able to have good health, including reproductive
health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.
3. Bodily integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure against violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic violence;
having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of
reproduction.
4. Senses, imagination, and thought. Being able to use the senses, to imagine,
think, and reason—and to do these things in a “truly human” way, a way
informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no
means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training.
Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing works and events of one’s own choice, religious, literary,
musical, and so forth. Being able to use one’s mind in ways protected by
guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid nonbeneficial pain.
5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people outside
ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence;
in general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and justified
anger. Not having one’s emotional development blighted by fear and anxiety. (Supporting this capability means supporting forms of human association that can be shown to be crucial in their development.)
6. Practical reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to
engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s life. (This entails
protection for the liberty of conscience and religious observance.)
7. Affiliation. (A) Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize
and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of
social interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another. (Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that constitute and nourish
such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of assembly and
political speech.) (B) Having the social bases of self-respect and
nonhumiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth
is equal to that of others. This entails provisions of nondiscrimination on
the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national
origin.
8. Other species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature.
9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.
10. Control over one’s environment. (A) Political. Being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one’s life; having the right of political
participation, protections of free speech and association. (B) Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods), and having property rights on an equal basis with others; having the right to seek
employment on an equal basis with others; having the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In work, being able to work as a human being,
exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of
mutual recognition with other workers.
NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 15, at 33–34.
37
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nents, distinct in quality—thus, we cannot satisfy a person’s entitlement to one of them by simply giving a larger amount of another
one.38 And all are held to be essential for minimal social justice for
each and every person.39
While one might employ the notion of capabilities in many sectors of society, formal and informal, civil and political, Nussbaum’s
version of the CA concentrates on the formulation of basic political
principles as a template for a nation’s fundamental constitutional and
legislative entitlements—as well as for norms in international law.40
Nussbaum, indeed, considers the CA to be a species of a human rights
approach, because, like human rights approaches, it sees all human
beings as having certain fundamental entitlements that cannot be
abridged or overridden without injustice.41
Thus, as noted at the outset, a CA provides a clear account not
only for why children should be recognized as rights bearers, but also
for why CROC and various national constitutions recognize various
rights for children with sensitivity to both agency and welfare needs.42
The idea of agency has a central role to play in the CA: the CA sees
people as striving agents, and in contrast to approaches that aim only
at the satisfaction of preferences, it aims at supporting the growth of
agency and practical reason.43 This emphasis on agency, under a CA,
further means that children should be afforded the maximum scope
38
See id. at 35 (“A nation cannot satisfy the need for one capability by giving people a
large amount of another, or even by giving them some money.”).
39
Id. at 36.
40
See NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 15, at 166; NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS
supra note 15, at 202; NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 15, at
70–71. For the connection of the approach to an idea of overlapping consensus and the
Rawlsian concept of “political liberalism,” see NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra
note 15, at 19, 109. See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, Perfectionist Liberalism and Political
Liberalism, 39 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 4 (2011) (arguing “that political liberalism is superior to
perfectionist liberalism as a basis for political principles in a pluralistic society”).
41
See Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human Rights, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 315,
332–33 (2004) (explaining that a CA distinguishes between what one values doing or being
and the means one has to achieve what one values). See generally Martha C. Nussbaum,
Capabilities, Entitlements, Rights: Supplementation and Critique, 12 J. HUM. DEV. & CAPABILITIES
23 (2011) [hereinafter Nussbaum, Capabilities, Entitlements, Rights] (exploring the “very
close” relationship between capabilities and human rights).
42
See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.
43
See supra note 34 and accompanying text. The word “autonomy” is often used in
this context. See, e.g., Michael D.A. Freeman, The Limits of Children’s Rights, in THE IDEOLOGIES OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 29, 37 (Michael Freeman & Philip Veerman eds., 1992) (“The
view I put forward is premised on the need to respect individual autonomy and to treat
persons as equals.” (emphasis added)). We prefer, however, to use more neutral words.
Autonomy is historically linked to the rejection of religious authority. It means being a law
unto oneself, as contrasted with following God’s law. See generally J.B. SCHNEEWIND, THE
INVENTION OF AUTONOMY: A HISTORY OF MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1998) (arguing
throughout that this is the right way of reading the history of the concept). The CA, as a
form of political liberalism, does not ground political principles in any particular comprehensive religious or secular doctrine—or in the denial of one. See NUSSBAUM, CREATING
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for decisional, freedom consistent with their actual—or potential—
capacity for rational and reasoned forms of choice, or judgment.44
For adolescents in particular, this may mean recognizing a range
of rights to sexual and reproductive choice, religious choice, and
choices regarding custody.45 In many cases, it will also mean granting
at least certain decisional rights to younger children. For young children, as Emily Buss notes, the right to make certain decisions provides
an important opportunity to practice thinking, and making decisions,
within certain protected bounds, so as to develop their future capacity
for meaningful agency.46 This also clearly accords with the terms of
both Articles 5 and 12 of CROC, which provide that state parties have
a duty to act “in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of
the child” and to ensure that any “child who is capable of forming his
or her own views” has a “right to express those views freely in all mat-

CAPABILITIES, supra note 15, at 89–93. On the concept of political liberalism, see supra note
40.
44
There is, of course, a vigorous debate among children’s rights scholars as to precisely how broad such decisional rights should be. Compare RICHARD FARSON, BIRTHRIGHTS
175–90 (1974) (arguing that “[t]he liberation of children requires that they be given the
right to vote”), and JOHN HOLT, ESCAPE FROM CHILDHOOD 18 (1974) (defending the view
that “the rights, privileges, duties, [and] responsibilities of adult citizens be made available
to any young person, of whatever age, who wants to make use of them”), with Freeman,
supra note 43, at 37–39 (defending greater limits on such rights, based on the need to
protect children’s future capabilities), and NOLAN, CHILDREN’S SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS,
supra note 9, at 10 (arguing that “child dependence cannot be ended merely by social or
political change”). For a useful summary and discussion, see id. at 12–13.
45
Whether the recognition of rights—such as the right to sexual choice—is justified
will depend in part on the level of knowledge and education on relevant issues in a society,
as well as background norms of gender equality that may affect issues of (informed) consent. Cf. ARCHARD, supra note 10, at 74–81. The right to vote, we noted in the Introduction, is a harder case, but again, the emphasis on agency means that the CA does not close
off the possibility of giving limited voting rights in some areas to adolescents. See supra
note 13 and accompanying text.
46
See Emily Buss, What the Law Should (And Should Not) Learn from Child Development
Research, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 13, 45 (2009) (“We sometimes argue for autonomy rights not
so much because adolescents ‘are ready’ to exercise them, but because they need practice
to learn how to exercise their rights well.”). Compare Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking
Ahead: An Empowerment Perspective on the Rights of Children, 68 TEMPLE L. REV. 1585, 1586
(1995) (putting forth the idea that “[r]econceputalizing rights as power permits us to look
ahead to a time when children may be respected as powerful, rights-bearing individuals”),
and Katherine Hunt Federle, Rights, Not Wrongs, 17 INT’L J. CHILDREN’S RTS. 321, 329
(2009) (arguing that the point of children’s rights is to “create mutual zones of respect,
challenging those who want to act in the best interests of children to promote the empowerment of children instead”), with Freeman, supra note 43, at 37–39 (arguing that question
is “what sort of action or conduct would we wish, as children, to be shielded against on the
assumption that we would want to mature to a rationally autonomous adulthood”), and
NOLAN, CHILDREN’S SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 12 (arguing that the work of
child liberationists “fails to adequately appreciate the way in which the exercise of such
rights (not to mention duties) may impact on the child’s enjoyment of other rights, both
now and in the future”).
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ters affecting the child” and to have those views given “due weight in
accordance” with his or her “age and maturity.”47
At the same time, an important contribution of the CA is that it
emphasizes that rights are not fully secured unless the related capabilities are actually present: otherwise rights are mere words on paper.48
It demonstrates, in other words, that all human capabilities have social
and economic conditions that require affirmative government action
(and government expenditure) for their realization. In that sense,
there is no such thing as a true “negative liberty” under CA: all basic
liberties require government action, including, but not limited to, the
inhibition of harmful action by others.49 Children’s rights are, again,
also no exception under a CA.50
In defining the meaning of equal rights for different groups, a
CA also insists that we should start with an understanding of how
groups and individuals differ in their requirements, given both physical and cognitive differences, but also differences of social starting
point.51 Indeed, it is precisely on account of the importance of context in determining what people are able to do and be that the CA has
been defended as superior to resource-based approaches: two people
may be given the same amount of some all-purpose resource such as
wealth and income, but differ in their real capabilities, whether because they have different physical needs or because they start from
different social positions.52 Children, in many cases, will also clearly
different from adults in the support they require from the state, in
order to develop and enjoy their capabilities.53
The entitlements of children have clear points of analogy in this
context to the rights of adults with cognitive disabilities, and the CA
47

CROC, supra note 7, at arts. 5, 12.
Sen denies that rights are intrinsically connected to government duties, but Nussbaum holds that they are and criticizes Sen’s argument. Compare Sen, supra note 41, at 340
(“The recognition of human rights is not an insistence that everyone everywhere rises to
help prevent every violation of every human right no matter where it occurs.”), with Nussbaum, Capabilities, Entitlements, Rights, supra note 41, at 26 (“[T]he whole world is under a
collective obligation to secure the capabilities to all world citizens, even if there is no worldwide political organization.”).
49
See Nussbaum, supra note 41, at 26–27.
50
See infra notes 147–48 and accompanying text.
51
For a discussion of the similarities and differences between children and other
groups in terms of enjoyment of their welfare rights, see NOLAN, CHILDREN’S SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 13–21.
52
See NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 15, at 35 (“At times group-based
policies (for example, affirmative action) may be effective instruments in the creation of
individual capabilities, but that is the only way they can be justified.”).
53
Id. at 26 (“Children, of course are different; requiring certain sorts of functioning
of them (as in compulsory education) is defensible as a necessary prelude to adult
capability.”).
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has been extensively developed in the latter area.54 Nussbaum has
argued that, as bearers of equal human dignity, adults with cognitive
disabilities are entitled to all the capabilities on the list, up to the
threshold level set for all.55 To say anything else would be to deny or
diminish their full and equal humanity.56 Getting them above the
threshold, however, may require special policies.57 While in areas
such as health and bodily integrity, this may be relatively straightforward, in others, such as those involving rights to political and civil
liberty, it may require complex forms of accommodation designed to
allow a person to choose the function in question directly, or to exercise the right by appropriate surrogate.58
Another important analogy between children and those with severe cognitive disabilities, in this context, is that they are also largely
overlooked by theories of justice in the social contract tradition.59
Such theories generally stipulate, for example, that the parties in the
contract process are (in the words of John Locke) “free, equal and
independent.”60 They are imagined as adults, dependent on nobody,
roughly equal not only in moral standing, but also in physical and
54
See generally NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS, supra note 15, at ch. 3 (discussing the intersection of capabilities and disabilities). Nussbaum identifies that “[t]he problem of constructed failure to fulfill human potential is even more acute in the case of people with
mental impairments.” Id. at 189.
55
See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text.
56
See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text.
57
Areas such as health and bodily integrity are relatively straightforward in this context, but puzzles arise when we consider areas such as education and especially, the political and civil liberties. For education, the approach taken by the United States under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) should be favored: the maximal development of the individual child’s abilities, in accordance with an Individualized Education
Plan. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(A) (2006). In the areas of political and civil liberty—and
in related areas such as property and contract—the best alternative is always one that permits the individual herself to choose the function in question. Thus, if assistance and
explanation at the polling place will enable the person with a cognitive disability to vote,
that assistance is required. See Nussbaum, The Capabilities of Persons with Cognitive Disabilities,
supra note 18, at 89. Cf. Help America Vote Act, 42 U.S.C. § 15481 (2006) (“The voting
system shall . . . be accessible for individuals with disabilities, including nonvisual accessibility for the blind and visually impaired, in a manner that provides the same opportunity for
access and participation (including privacy and independence) as for other voters . . . .”).
Where that is not possible, given the nature and extent of the person’s disability, the approach recommends surrogacy: the surrogate will attempt to ascertain the views and wishes
of her “client,” and, where this is impossible, will vote in that person’s interest. See Nussbaum, The Capabilities of People with Cognitive Disabilities, supra note 18, at 91–93. Nussbaum
argues that a failure to give that person a vote, even when only a surrogate can actually
exercise the function, is a failure to treat this person as a fully equal human being and
citizen. Id. at 91. For discussion, see id. at 75–76, 84–87, 89.
58
Id. at 93.
59
See NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS, supra note 15, at 103–04; see also Nussbaum, The Capabilities of People with Cognitive Disabilities, supra note 18, at 333–34 (discussing variations of social
contract theory).
60
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, Second Treatise § 95, at 348–49 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1689).
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mental powers.61 Although there are theoretical reasons for this hypothetical simplification—because it serves to dramatize the fact that,
once we imagine away artificial distinctions of class and wealth,
human beings really are in many instances roughly equal in power,
and thus stand to gain from cooperation—the fiction eliminates
much that characterizes real life.62 Childhood and old age are entirely omitted, as are periods of disability in the “prime of life,” and, of
course, the lifelong disabilities with which many people live.63 Thus,
while such theories prove able to deal well with issues of justice involving wealth, class, race, and gender, they have glaring weaknesses in
dealing both with lifelong disability and with the human life cycle.
Nussbaum has discussed this issue in the context of disability,64 but it
clearly pertains to children as well: theories grounded in the classical
social contract cannot adequately incorporate children’s unusual vulnerability and their needs for care. Nor, in fact, can they conceive of
children’s fully equal humanity, since equal humanity is connected to
the hypothesized equality of physical and mental powers.
This difference between theories in the social contract tradition
and the CA is also especially stark when it comes to the rights of very
young children. Article 1 of CROC, for example, provides that “every
human being below the age of eighteen years” is protected by the
Convention, unless they are an adult under national law.65 The U.N.
Committee on the Rights of the Child has also affirmed in its General
Comment Number 7 that “young children are holders of all the rights
enshrined in the Convention” and “are entitled to special protection
measures and, in accordance with their evolving capacities, the progressive exercise of their rights.”66 While social contract theories provide no account for why this makes sense, a CA provides a clear
explanation for why all children—including very young children—are
entitled to be treated as rights bearers.
The starting point for the CA is the fact that human beings come
into the world with a variety of inchoate capacities that need development.67 The CA argues that these nascent abilities exert a moral
61

NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS, supra note 15, at 103–04.
Id. at 104.
63
Id. at 96–103.
64
See id. at 103–54
65
CROC, supra note 7.
66
Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Gen. Comment No. 7 on its 40th Sess., Sept.
12–30, 2005, Implementing Child Rights in Early Childhood, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/7/
Rev.1 (Sept. 20, 2006), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/docs/AdvanceVersions/GeneralComment7Rev1.pdf.
67
See Nussbaum, Constitutions and Capabilities, supra note 3, at 49 (“Human abilities
come into the world in a nascent or undeveloped form and require support from the
environment—including support for physical health and especially, here, for mental development—if they are to mature in a way that is worthy of human dignity.”).
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claim that they should be developed up to the point at which they
reach the threshold level of each capability specified on the capabilities list. Without that development, they are fruitless, cut off, only a
shadow of what they might be.68 This idea of waste and tragedy is at
the heart of the political imperatives generated by the CA. The theory
is thus in its very nature intensely focused on early childhood, as a
time when critical forms of support for development are either present or absent. Adam Smith, observing that children in Scotland were
sent to publicly provided schooling, while children in England went
straight into the factory, says that the human capacities of the English
children are “mutilated and deformed” by that treatment. This is in
fact the core moral intuition that guides the CA.69
At the same time, the focus on dignity under a CA also means
that there are important differences between theories in the social
contract tradition and a CA when it comes to various limits on the
rights of children imposed by CROC and various national constitutions, in areas such as voting and jury service.70 The focus on dignity
under a CA means that (by contrast to a social contract approach),
the key question is always what measures are required to show full
respect to the equal human dignity of each.71 Thus the question of
political rights for children is at least on the table in the CA, whereas
it is not in the social contract tradition. If, however, there are actual
differences in the internal72 capabilities of the average child or teenager, compared to similarly situated adult, denying children access to
jury service, or the vote, need not send any message of disrespect, or
exclusion, to any child—whereas it almost certainly would to any adult
citizen.73 It may thus also be legitimate for the state to defer access to
68

See id. at 50.
For Smith’s relation to the CA and this passage in particular, see id. at 46–50.
70
See generally CHILDREN AND CITIZENSHIP (Antonella Invernizzi & Jane Williams eds.,
2008) (providing a useful general discussion of children’s citizenship rights).
71
See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
72
For more on the difference between “internal” and “combined” capabilities, see
NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 15, at 21. Internal capabilities are “characteristics of a person (personality traits, intellectual and emotional capabilities, states of
bodily fitness and health, internalized learning, skills of perception and movement).” Id.
These are developed through environmental input and are not innate, but they may be
present without guaranteeing a person’s freedom to choose and act. See id. When all the
conditions are in place for a real choice of a given function, then the person has a “combined capability.” Id. A person may, for example, be well educated and capable of freedom of speech in the internal sense, but lack it in the combined sense because of
repressive political institutions. Id.
73
See Steven Lecce, Should Democracy Grow Up? Children and Voting Rights, 9 INTERGENERATIONAL JUST. REV. 133, 134 (2009) (arguing that there is “nothing necessarily
objectionable about using age as a reliable proxy for various competences that might be
relevant to people’s abilities to effectively discharge rights and responsibilities,” whereas
reliance on age alone would, like reliance on race or sex, be clearly morally objectionable).
69
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such rights, even where older children are otherwise subject to the
burdens and benefits of the law.74
A deferral of this kind is likely to promote the long-term development of relevant capabilities for older children. One could imagine,
for example, that deferring access to the vote could instill in young
people a sense of the seriousness of voting, and the need for mature
and informed judgment, as a voter, but also that it could discourage
political engagement at a crucially formative time.75 A CA thus merely
sanctions the possibility that it could be legitimate for a democracy to
delay access to the vote for children. It does not suggest that it will be
legitimate, in all cases, for it to do so.76
This understanding, however, is entirely consistent with the omission of voting rights from an international human rights instrument
such as CROC, as it leaves the issue to be resolved according to the
particular national and historical circumstances.77
II
SPECIAL PRIORITY

FOR

CHILDREN?

In other respects, however, there is a potential tension between a
CA and aspects of CROC and national constitutions protecting children’s rights, in that in recognizing certain rights for children, such
instruments sometimes purport to give special priority to children, at
the potential direct expense of adults.
Not all forms of special priority for particular rights-claimants will
raise difficulties under a CA. This is especially clear where one person’s choices are likely to cause harm to another’s central capabilities,
since the capabilities have already been defined so as not to give people any right to violate the rights of others.78 While the outer boundaries of such a harm principle are often difficult to define, the basic
idea behind such a principle is clear: one person loses any legitimate
74
For a critical exploration of the logic of this argument under social contract-based
approaches, see for example, ARCHARD, supra note 10, at 70–73.
75
Cf. Lecce, supra note 73, at 137 (suggesting that, in the context of the right to vote,
“children’s present incapacities might, themselves, be partially related to their political
disenfranchisement”).
76
Another potential reason for children to be granted the right to vote, for example,
is that it may help overcome a systematic failure by democratic policy makers, in a particular national context, to pay attention to the needs and interests of children. See generally
Elizabeth F. Cohen, Neither Seen nor Heard: Children’s Citizenship in Contemporary Democracies,
9 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 221 (2005) (discussing the strengths and weaknesses of this as a potential justification for giving voting rights to children); Lecce, supra note 73, at 136 (same);
Nolan, The Child as “Democratic Citizen,” supra note 13, at 769–74 (same). Such an instrumental justification for granting voting rights to children will also tend, in most cases, to be
entirely consistent with a CA.
77
For critical discussion of this “participation gap” under CROC, however, see Nolan,
The Child as “Democratic Citizen,” supra note 13, at 774–80.
78
See supra note 28.
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claim to exercise their capabilities in a certain way when such action
undermines the central, or fundamental, capabilities of others.79
This principle can also be applied to justify certain forms of restrictions on the freedoms of adults to make choices that affect the
future capabilities of their children. In the United States, for example, adults have rights to liberty of conscience in religious matters that
extend to their health choices, even when those choices involve forgoing lifesaving treatment.80 Thus, adult Jehovah’s Witnesses may sometimes lawfully refuse blood transfusions.81 But adults, in many cases,
cannot refuse essential medical treatment for their children on religious grounds: Christian Scientists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and other sects
have all been denied the right to enforce their religious medical
choices on their children.82 Another similar line of cases pertains to
79

For debate between Sen and Nussbaum in this area, see NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPAsupra note 15, at 71–73 (questioning whether “promoting freedom is even a coherent political project”); Nussbaum, Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements, supra note 15, at
47 (describing as “hopelessly vague” Sen’s endorsement of “freedom/capability”). In essence, Sen holds that it is always right to expand the set of capabilities that people have, no
matter the content of the capabilities. See Nussbaum, Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements, supra note 15, at 44–45. Nussbaum argues that we must not acknowledge as “central
capabilities,” and certainly not seek to expand, those that involve violation of the rights of
others. Nussbaum uses as examples the capability to harass women in the workplace, the
capability to refuse employment on grounds of race, and the capability to pollute the environment. Id. Sen’s reply is that capability is always good in itself, though it might be
misused. He gives the example of male strength: it is a good thing in itself, though it might
be used to beat up women. Id. at 46 (citing Sen’s remarks in Bielefeld in July 2001).
Nussbaum argues that this is simply not satisfactory: some capabilities contain harm in
their very definition (for example, those that she has mentioned as instances). Id. at
46–47. There simply is nothing good about the capability to refuse employment to African-Americans, she argues, so the law should remove it. See id.
80
See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990) (recognizing that
“cases involv[ing] patients who refuse[ ] medical treatment forbidden by their religious
beliefs” implicate “First Amendment rights as well as common-law rights of selfdetermination”).
81
See, e.g., Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125, 130 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (“[A]
state-appointed conservator’s ordering of medical treatment for a [Jehovah’s Witness] in
violation of his religious beliefs, no matter how well intentioned the conservator may be,
violates the First Amendment’s freedom of exercise clause in the absence of some substantial state interest.”).
82
See, e.g., Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852, 855 (Cal. 1988) (holding that a
Christian Scientist mother could be prosecuted for involuntary manslaughter and felony
child endangerment after her child died of meningitis “after receiving treatment by prayer
in lieu of medical attention”); People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769, 773 (Ill.
1952) (also permitting a blood transfusion for a child over the objections of Jehovah’s
Witness parents on the grounds that “a child whose parents refuse to permit a blood transfusion, when lack of a transfusion means that the child will almost certainly die or at best
will be mentally impaired for life, is a neglected child”); Lundman v. McKown, 530 N.W.2d
807, 828–29 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding Christian Scientist caregivers liable in a
wrongful death action for failing to treat symptoms of juvenile-onset diabetes); State v.
Perricone, 181 A.2d 751, 757 (N.J. 1962) (holding that the religious beliefs of parents who
were Jehovah’s Witnesses did not permit them to refuse blood transfusions for a dying
child, or, in the words of the court, to make “martyrs” of their children (quoting Prince v.
BILITIES,
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education: parents may not refuse compulsory education for their
children, although the Old Order Amish were given an accommodation that permitted them to withdraw their children from school at
age fourteen.83 The opinions in these cases, however, explicitly discussed the futures of the children and whether they were likely to
have employment opportunities.84
Absent such a direct conflict between the rights of parents and
children, however, the commitment to the universal protection of
rights under a CA means that it will be far more difficult to justify the
allocation of special priority to children. The CA provides an account
of each person’s fundamental entitlements—entitlements that must
be secured to everyone as a necessary condition of minimal social justice.85 All entitlements are held to be required by the notion of a life
worthy of people’s equal human dignity.86 When, therefore, a given
capability cannot be secured to everyone, or when securing one capability means forgoing another, that is a tragic conflict, which deserves
to be marked as such.87 Both CROC and various national constitutions, however, frequently give just this kind of special priority to chilMassachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944))); see also Isolde Raftery, Changes in Oregon Law Put
Faith-Healing Parents on Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2011, at A14 (describing a recent episode
concerning the Followers of Christ Church: parents who refused medical treatment on
religious grounds for a child with a benign tumor that might cause blindness if untreated
were indicted for first-degree criminal mistreatment in Oregon. The child was placed in
foster care for two months while she received treatment.). For discussion of the constitutional standard, see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF
AMERICA’S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 115–74 (2008).
83
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972). Homeschooling is another potentially important exception granted to parents in the United States, in this context. Cf.
Combs v. Homer-Center Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 2008) (recognizing a parent’s right to direct a child’s education, but holding that “the right to be free from all
reporting requirements and ‘discretionary’ state oversight of a child’s home-school education[,] has never been recognized” (emphasis added)). Whether home schooling as currently practiced, with virtually no oversight or curricular requirement, is compatible with
the development of children’s capabilities as citizens is, however, open to question. In
Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, 827 F.2d 1058, 1060, 1068 (6th Cir. 1987), the
court reasoned that the government has a compelling interest in ensuring that children
learn about the varied religious and ethnic groups that compose their society—in response
to a “born again Christian” mother who wanted her children to be shielded from such
knowledge, asserting that the Bible was all her children needed to know. See id. But if the
parent had simply chosen homeschooling, the entire issue would not have arisen—and the
children would not have learned about other types of people.
84
See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 228–29, 239–40, 245–46. The case has been criticized in many
ways; one clear problem is that the future employment opportunities of girls were not
discussed. After withdrawal from school, Amish boys learn carpentry and farming, highly
exportable skills; girls learn only household management. See NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 15, at 233.
85
See NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 15, at 71.
86
See NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 15, at 5.
87
See NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 15, at 36–39.
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dren’s rights, without explicitly acknowledging the moral difficulty, in
some cases amounting to a tragic choice, that this involves.
Take the provisions in various rights instruments giving special
priority to “the best interests of the child” in various areas of state
action concerning children.88 Article 3(1) of CROC provides that in
the context of state action (as opposed to inaction) “concerning children . . . the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”89 Constitutions such as the Brazilian constitution go even
further, providing that it is the duty of the state to ensure “children
and adolescents, with absolute priority, the rights to life, health, nourishment, education, leisure, professional training, culture, dignity, respect, liberty and family and community harmony.”90 While such
provisions do not always limit fundamental rights for adults (not every
claim to individual liberty counts as fundamental under a CA, according to Nussbaum),91 they clearly have the potential to do so in some
cases, such as those involving decisions about family (re)location or
freedom of movement.92
A similar form of special priority is also given quite expressly to
children by CROC and various national constitutions in the context of
various so-called “socioeconomic” or “welfare” rights.93 When it
comes to the right to health, for example, CROC requires states parties to take “all appropriate legislative, administrative, and other measures . . . to the maximum extent of their available resources,” for the
implementation of the right to “the highest attainable standard of
88
See, e.g., CROC, supra note 7, at art. 3, § 1; see also Philip Alston, The Best Interests
Principle: Towards a Reconciliation of Culture and Human Rights, 8 INT’L J.L. & FAM. 1, 3–4
(1994) (collecting other human rights instruments invoking the same or similar phrase).
89
This provision was also clearly intended to make the best interests of the child
paramount over the interest of adults, except in a limited range of circumstances. See
Philip Alston, The Legal Framework of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 91/2 BULL.
HUM. RTS. 1, 9 (1992). See generally Alston, supra note 88 (exploring the significance of the
“best interests” principle in the “overall human rights context”).
90
CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 227 (Braz.). (emphasis added);
see also NOLAN, CHILDREN’S SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 239 n.60.
91
See NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 15, at 73 (“[Some freedoms] are
not implicit in our conception of social justice, and certainly they should not appear in a
list of fundamental constitutional rights.”).
92
See, e.g., U v U (2002) 211 CLR 238, 242 (Austl.) (restricting the rights of the adult
female appellant to move internationally, according to a best-interests-of-the-child standard). For discussion, see Juliet Behrens, U v U: The High Court on Relocation, 27 MELB. U.
L. REV. 572, 573 (2003) (encouraging legislative reform to embody presumptions which
defer to the judgment of a child’s primary caregiver in relocation cases).
93
From the perspective of CA, the distinction is, of course, ultimately quite artificial,
given that all rights require government expenditure for their realization and preservation.
See NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 15, at 64–67. For another criticism of the
distinction as artificial, see, for example, Terence Daintith, The Constitutional Protection of
Economic Rights, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 56, 57–64 (2004); Cécile Fabre, Constitutionalising Social
Rights, 6 J. POL. PHIL. 263, 264 (1998); Nolan, The Child’s Right to Health, supra note 9, at
145.
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health,” whereas the equivalent provisions in the ICESCR require
states to take such measures only “with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the right[ ].”94 Similarly, when it comes to
the right to an “adequate standard of living” recognized by both
CROC and the ICESCR, CROC requires that states parties must,
“within their means . . . provide material assistance and support
programmes” to facilitate the realization of this right, “particularly
with regard to nutrition, clothing and housing,” whereas ICESCR simply imposes a far more general obligation on states to “take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right.”95
At a national constitutional level, Section 28 of the South African
constitution likewise requires that, when it comes to children, the
South African government is to consider “[a] child’s best interests
[which] are of paramount importance” in protecting the right of
every child to “basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and
social services,” whereas, for persons more generally, it is only required by Sections 26 and 27 to “take reasonable legislative and other
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive
realisation” of equivalent rights, such as the right have access to adequate housing, health care services, sufficient food, and water.96 Similarly, in Colombia, Article 44 of the constitution provides that
children have a basic right to “health and social security,”97 while citizens more generally are entitled only to “access to services that promote, protect, and rehabilitate public health,”98 and social security,
the content of which may be determined by law.99
94
See CROC, supra note 7, at arts. 4, 24, § 1; ICESCR, supra note 6, at art. 2. It is
possible, of course, that this textual difference will be “read down” by the Committee on
the Rights of the Child. See, e.g., Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment
5: General Measures of Implementation for the Convention on the Rights of the Child, ¶ 5
(2003), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/%28symbol%29/CRC.GC.2003.5.
En (suggesting that the approach of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights to art. 2(1) of ICESCR should be seen as “complementary” to the approach taken to
art. 4). The Constitutional Court of South Africa has taken a similar approach in Grootboom
in the context of the right to shelter. See infra note 102. The text itself, however, does not
make such an approach inevitable.
95
See ICESCR, supra note 6, at art. 11; CROC, supra note 7, at art. 27.
96
See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, §§ 26–28.
97
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 44.
98
Id. at art. 49.
99
Id. at art. 48 (recognizing social security as a “mandatory public service . . . [to] be
delivered under the administration, coordination, and control of the state, subject to the
principles of efficiency, universality, and solidarity within the limits established by law”; an
“irrevocable right” but also one that must be “gradually extend[ed]” by the state to “include the provision of services in the form determined by law”). Children under age one
also have additional rights to free health care, though such rights may be regulated by law.
See id. at art. 50.
A similar contrast could arguably be made under the Honduran Constitution. Compare CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE HONDURAS art. 123, translated in Constitution of Honduras, HONDURAS.COM, http://www.honduras.com/honduras-constitution-
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Courts in these countries have also frequently read these provisions so as to give special priority to children, as opposed to adults, as
rights claimants.100 The most notable instance of this in South Africa
occurred in Grootboom v. Oostenberg Municipality,101 where, at first instance, Judge Dennis Davis relied on the constitution’s Section 28 to
order that various local authorities provide basic shelter (that is, tents,
portable toilets, and potable drinking water) to approximately 510
children and their parents, where in respect of the adult claimants
themselves, he limited his order to a more general form of declaratory
relief.102 Another example, though less stark, is the finding of the
South African Constitutional Court (SACC) in theTAC case103 that it
was unreasonable under Section 27(2) of the South African Constitution for the government to fail to provide HIV-positive women with
access to anti-retroviral treatment aimed at preventing the mother-tochild transmission (MTCT) of HIV.104 (In reaching this conclusion,
the SACC in no way went beyond the narrow confines of the case, by
suggesting, for example, that women had an equivalent right of access
to anti-retroviral treatment, post-pregnancy.105)
In Colombia, a similar pattern can also be observed in the decision of the Constitutional Court in the landmark case of SU-225/
98,106 recognizing a right on the part of poor children to state-funded
vaccination against meningitis, without any accompanying suggestion
english.html#.TyayUCOpWtl (last visited Jan. 30, 2012) (recognizing the right of children
to “grow and develop in good health”), with id. at art. 145 (recognizing a “right to health
protection”).
100
For discussion of this point, see Nolan, The Child’s Right to Health, supra note 9, at
145.
101
2000 (3) BCLR 277 (CC) (S. Afr.).
102
Judge Davis’s reasoning in this context was ultimately overturned by the Constitutional Court of South Africa on appeal, but the order itself was not contested by the local
municipalities, and was thus not overturned. See Gov’t of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at paras. 74–79 (S. Afr.) (determining that the High Court erred
in holding that there is “a separate and independent right[ ] for children and their parents” to shelter and social services); Grootboom 2011 (7) BCLR 651 (CC) at paras. 5, 73–79.
For discussion, see Rosalind Dixon, Creating Dialogue About Socioeconomic Rights: Strong-Form
Versus Weak-Form Judicial Review Revisited, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 391, 395–98 (2007).
103
Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign (No. 2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S.
Afr.).
104
See id. at paras. 4–5, 135; see also id. at paras. 4, 74–79 (emphasizing the importance
of the rights of newborn children under Section 28, and the way in which the case involved
“the right of children to be afforded special protection”).
105
There were, of course obvious strategic reasons why the plaintiffs did not raise this
broader claim directly. Cf. id. at para. 19 (providing a summary of the applicants’ case).
However, in discussing § 27(2) the court clearly had an opportunity to make at least some
tentative comments on this issue.
106
Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], mayo 20, 1998, M.P: E.
Cifuentes Muñoz, Sentencia SU-225/98 (Colom.). For discussion, see NOLAN, CHILDREN’S
SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 11; Alicia Ely Yamin & Oscar Parra Vera, The
Role of Courts in Defining Health Policy: The Case of the Colombian Constitutional Court
4 (2008) (Harvard Law School Human Rights Program), available at http://
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that unvaccinated adults would be entitled to any equivalent form of
state-funded medical treatment for the same (or similar) condition.
Existing attempts to justify this form of special priority for children’s rights also tend to sit uneasily with a CA. One idea, advanced
by some in the U.S., for example, is that children enjoy special rights,
not shared by adults, because of the need to ensure that they have the
opportunities necessary to “achieve [their] full potential as . . . selfsupporting citizen[s].”107 Another idea, famously endorsed by Justice
Powell in Plyler v Doe, is that children will sometimes be deserving of
special rights, not shared by adults, because they are entirely “innocent” in respect of the circumstances that have created the need for
state support, or intervention.108 Neither of these arguments, however, is ultimately sufficient to justify the grant of special rights to children under a CA, when similar rights are denied to adults.
Notions of equal opportunity certainly have an important role to
play in a CA. The very idea of capability is an idea of substantive opportunity, and the CA imagines human beings as striving individuals
who need a supportive context in order to become capable of a range
of choices of functioning.109 However, the idea of “self-supporting”
adults is often used unclearly, with an implication that the main aim
of the state is to avoid being burdened by costs. Thus, in Wisconsin v.
Yoder the Supreme Court justified the withdrawal of Amish children
from school by pointing to the fact that they were a prosperous community and their children would not be a drag on the public coffers.110 That is not the idea of “self-supporting” people that is used by
the CA: the CA focuses on what circumstances do to create substantive
opportunities for individual people;111 thus, the question that ought
to be asked is how the withdrawal from school affects a wide range of
opportunities for individual Amish children.
In addition, the CA also insists that the state has obligations to
individuals beyond ensuring them equal access to certain basic social
and economic opportunities.112 Part of the key idea behind a CA, as
www.law.harvard.edu/programs/hrp/documents/Yamin_Parra_working_paper.pdf (last
visited Oct. 12, 2011).
107
See Martha Minow, Children’s Rights: Where We’ve Been, and Where We’re Going, 68 TEMPLE L. REV. 1573, 1576 (1995) (quoting Phyllis Schafley’s “Declaration of a Child’s Rights”).
108
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 238–39 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring) (upholding a
right of access to public school education for children of undocumented aliens).
109
See NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 15, at 21 (stating that “[o]ne job
of a society that wants to promote the most important human capabilities is to support
[their] development” by providing resources and education, and by supporting families).
110
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 224–25, 240 (1972).
111
See NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 15, at 18 (describing the CA as
focusing on both an individual’s well-being and “the opportunities available to each
person”).
112
See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text.
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Part I notes, is that even an enormous amount of striving and preplanning do not necessarily protect individuals from blows that make
it impossible for them to live a life worthy of full human dignity, without help from others.113 Thus the very idea that the goal of education
and state support is to produce people who are “self-supporting” ignores the very great degree of vulnerability to accident that individuals retain throughout their lives, even with the best education and
care.
As for ideas about children and innocence, they are ultimately
insufficient to justify the simultaneous recognition of certain rights for
children and denial of equivalent rights for most adults under a
CA.114 The term “innocence” is used in two ways. At times it is used
loosely, as a mere synonym of “vulnerability”—and in this case we have
no objection to recognizing “innocence” so used (albeit confusingly)
as a source of special attention.115 A CA starts with notions of human
frailty and vulnerability, and it argues that, from a moral standpoint,
the state has an obligation to ensure that all persons have access to a
life worthy of human dignity—in their frailty and vulnerability. But at
other times, the word “innocence” is used in its more accurate meaning, as the antonym of “guilt,” and the idea is suggested that people
lose their claim to entitlements if they are not morally good or pure in
some respect: as, for example, when children are called the “innocent
victims” of HIV/AIDS, with the implication that others, for example
gay men, are the “guilty” victims,116 or when it is said that a nice person does not “deserve” to be killed, with the implication that homicide
is less grave if the victim is, say, a prostitute or a convict.117 We utterly
reject this way of thinking. All individuals are entitled to claim the
protections of a CA, even those, who as (then) President Chaskalson
of the South African Constitutional Court put it, are “the worst and

113
See NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS, supra note 15, at 156–58 (discussing the mutual advantages deriving from cooperation and a shared life among the people in a society).
114
For a critical examination of these ideas in the context of children’s rights, see, for
example, ARCHARD, supra note 10, at 36–41.
115
See id. at 39.
116
See, e.g., E. Glenn Schellenberg et al., “Innocent Victims” of AIDS: Identifying the Subtext, 25 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1790, 1791 (1995) (describing the tendency to refer to
“infants, hemophiliacs, and people who had blood transfusions as ‘innocent’ victims of
AIDS”).
117
See Matthew Walberg & Ted Gregory, Hanover Park Woman Who Feared Husband Is
Found Dead, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 27, 2011. At the end of a story about a woman who was first
battered and then stalked and murdered by her husband, an acquaintance of the woman
says: “[she] was just the nicest person. Everybody who came in[to the restaurant] loved her.
She was just a great mom, a great bartender, a great co-worker. She didn’t do anything
wrong; she didn’t deserve this.” But suppose she had been a nasty person and an incompetent bartender. . . .
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the weakest amongst us.”118 Notions of guilt and innocence will, accordingly, have only a quite narrow role to play under a CA.
Individuals who engage in wrongdoing may certainly be punished
consistent with a CA: indeed, the concern for the dignity of victims,
and their right to bodily security and control over their environment,
under a CA, will often mean that a CA will require that a person be
punished for their wrongful actions.119 A CA, however, also insists
that any such punishment be proportionate to the relevant crime; and
also that any individual wrongdoer be treated as a bearer of rights,
entitled to full human dignity, in all other respects.120 This, in most
instances, will also make it extremely difficult for the state to justify
denying adults access to the kind of rights afforded to children. It
certainly would not explain, for example, the result in cases such as
Plyler, Grootboom, or TAC, even if one assumes some relevant form of
wrongdoing by adults.121
While children may well be entitled to special priority when it
comes to various rights, under a CA, therefore, in most cases a different justification for such priority will be required. The remainder of
this Part explores two principles—one based on notions of childhood
vulnerability and another on the cost-effectiveness of protecting children’s rights—that may provide such a justification.
A. A Vulnerability Principle
When people talk about children and children’s rights, they
often talk about the vulnerability of children.122 Unlike most nonhuman animals, children remain profoundly dependent on adults for a
substantial time. Their cognitive development proceeds rapidly, so
118
S v. Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 431 para. 88 (S. Afr.). “Weakest” evidently refers to vulnerability, while “worst” underlines our point that moral guilt
does not mean that a person loses fundamental entitlements. On vulnerability, see infra
Part II.A.
119
See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 15, at 148 (“[D]omestic violence and child sexual abuse should be aggressively policed by the state.”).
120
This necessarily flows from the CA’s recognition that “human dignity . . . is equal in
all who are agents in the first place.” Id. at 31.
121
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign
(No. 2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S. Afr.); Gov’t of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA
46 (CC) (S. Afr.). In TAC, though some adults contract HIV-AIDS as a result of consensual
forms of sex or intravenous drug-use and almost all young children living with HIV have
absolutely no control over the circumstances in which they contract the disease, this difference cannot mean that it is justifiable, from the perspective of a CA, to recognize a right to
access to antiretroviral treatments for children, while simultaneously denying such a right
for most adults. Even when the conduct through which an adult contracts HIV is illegal
(intravenous drug use, for example), punishing that illegality via a later refusal of lifesaving treatment would be grossly disproportionate to the relevant form of wrongdoing
involved. For discussion of the potential “wrongdoing” of adults in Grootboom, and its lack
of moral opprobrium, see infra notes 180–82 and accompanying text.
122
See Minow, supra note 10, at 297.
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that within the first year they are able to see the world from the perspective of another and to make simple judgments of fairness, but
they still require many years to achieve full emotional and cognitive
maturity.123 Physically, they also remain unable to move from place to
place on their own and are thus unable to ensure their own survival.
Physical maturity takes more than a decade,124 and emotional maturity, including mature choice-making ability, arrives only in late adolescence.125 These features of the human life cycle are unique, and they
mean that children are completely dependent on the care of others.
Furthermore, their immobility means that, even though their cognition can develop rapidly, they remain at the mercy of their surroundings for cognitive and emotional stimulation and stability.
This form of cognitive, emotional, and physical vulnerability, we
suggest, is also an important reason why CROC and various national
constitutions often recognize rights in a way that is distinctive to children. Consider, for example, the provisions in CROC requiring states
to encourage the production and dissemination of children’s books
and to protect children’s right to “rest and leisure.”126 Further consider the duty imposed on states by Article 37 of CROC to ensure that
the detention of children is “a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time.”127 Differences in the physical and
cognitive abilities, or emotional maturity, of children may mean that
these rights are simply an attempt to give substantively equal content
to the same rights—to recreation, and freedom from cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment—enjoyed by adults: children’s imagination
and creativity, for example, are likely to be stimulated by quite different books than those that appeal to adults; and children are also likely
to experience quite different levels of trauma, and psychological
harm, as a result of experiences such as detention. Thus, it clearly
makes sense under a CA to define children’s rights in a way that is
somewhat different from adults.
In focusing on children’s vulnerability under a CA, however, it is
also important to recognize that many forms of vulnerability experienced by children are common to others—including adults with cog-

123

See PAUL BLOOM, DESCARTES’ BABY: HOW THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT EXWHAT MAKES US HUMAN 119–21 (2004).
124
See, e.g., ARCHARD, supra note 10, at 27. (“[T]he 12-year-old is . . . at or close to
puberty.”).
125
Cf. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010) (“Difficulty in weighing longterm consequences; a corresponding impulsiveness; and reluctance to trust defense counsel seen as part of the adult world a rebellious youth rejects, all can lead to poor decisions
by one charged with a juvenile offense.”).
126
CROC, supra note 7, at arts. 17, 31.
127
Id. at art. 37.
PLAINS
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nitive disabilities.128 For them as well, active state protection is
needed for a wide range of capabilities, to a degree that is not required by adults without such disabilities. This difference (between
children and adults with severe cognitive disabilities and other adults)
is a matter of degree: all people need state protection for health, bodily integrity, the exercise of choice and agency, the opportunity for
play and leisure time, the exercise of property rights, and so forth.129
In the case of children and adults with severe cognitive disabilities,
however, the state must remain more deeply involved in protecting
capabilities, frequently through delegation of some powers to a guardian or surrogate, but also through the supervision and limitation of
those powers.130 In many respects, then, the case of children is not
unique.
By itself, children’s physical vulnerability, therefore, will also be
insufficient in most cases to justify any special priority—as opposed to
special scope—for the rights of children, as compared to adults,
under a CA. Instead, what is needed is an account that focuses on the
more or less unique vulnerability of children to the decisions of
others—that is, those adults legally and economically responsible for
their care.131
Children are economically dependent on adults, in most countries, in a variety of ways.132 They often lack the skills and training
necessary to earn decent wages from any paid work they perform.
They are also often prohibited from engaging in significant amounts
of such work by laws requiring compulsory school attendance and
prohibiting employers from hiring those below a certain age.133 The
law in most countries also makes children legally dependent on parents and guardians in a variety of other ways—for example, by giving
parents (and guardians) broad rights to decide questions such as
where a child will live, or go to school, or how they should be represented legally and politically.134
128
See NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS, supra note 15, at 96–98 (giving examples of adults whose
mental disabilities may leave them permanently dependent upon others).
129
See id. at 168–69.
130
See id. at 195.
131
See NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 15, at 148 (noting that state action is often needed in the policing of child abuse, child marriage, child labor, and educational decisions).
132
For discussion of children’s economic powerlessness, see NOLAN, CHILDREN’S
SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 83–84.
133
See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 212 (2006) (establishing federal provisions to limit child labor); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (recognizing that
while there may be a “State[ ] interest in universal compulsory education, it is by no means
absolute to the exclusion or subordination of all other interests”).
134
Cf. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 15, at 230–31 (noting
that states often acknowledge broad parental rights due to parents’ “legitimate rights over
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There are also, in many cases, good reasons for this kind of legally sanctioned dependence. Because children do not achieve full
emotional and choice-related maturity prior to adolescence, it makes
sense to give parents broad decisional rights at an earlier time. Doing
so simply reflects the importance of adult choice-capacities, which
children are expected to develop later in time. Laws making education compulsory and banning child labor also help ensure that children in fact have the space and support necessary to develop in this
way. And because, as the Introduction notes, children will ultimately
attain full adult freedom, it does not denigrate them to impose such
limits on their freedom in the interim.
In this respect, the position is utterly different from that of adult
women, who have often been denied mature choice capabilities in
many areas as a result of an artificially constructed type of infantalization.135 Even where, because of artificial restrictions on movement
and education, adult women’s choice-capabilities have in fact not
been developed, they remain fully mature adults, and their dignity
would be compromised were their rights to be made proportional to
their actual educational attainment. Young children, by contrast, are
not insulted by being treated as immature, and on the way to full adult
choice.
By defining the usual case as one in which parents are entrusted
with primary responsibility for protecting and developing the capabilities of their children, however, the CA does not say that children have
to live with parental choices that in fact compromise their development, in health, education, and other areas.136 On the contrary, there
is a strong argument under a CA that by sanctioning this form of legal
dependence for children, the state should assume responsibility for
protecting children from the consequences of the special vulnerability
it creates in relation to the decisions of others—by insuring them
against the risk that their parents (or legal guardian) will turn out to
be unable, or unwilling, to take reasonable steps to protect their capabilities.137 This, we suggest, is ultimately the best way to understand
[their children]” and because it can be difficult to determine a child’s actual choice given
“parental power and the child’s economic dependency”).
135
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 897–98 (1992) (criticizing the now moribund traditional common-law principle that “a woman had no legal
existence separate from her husband, who was regarded as her head and representative in
the social state” (citing Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J.,
concurring))).
136
See infra notes 179, 180, and 182 and accompanying text.
137
Cf. NOLAN, CHILDREN’S SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 8 (criticizing the
“public neglect of children as an aggregated group, justified by the theory that they are
solely the responsibility of their parents”). For ideas about the insurance-based function of
constitutional rights in a quite different context, compare, for example, TOM GINSBURG,
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 26 (2003)
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arguments about the special “innocence” of children in respect of the
enjoyment of certain welfare rights: a total lack of control over certain
decisions will give individuals a stronger claim to protection by the
state than have had partial agency over relevant outcomes.
In most countries, a similar argument is widely accepted in the
context of the rights of prisoners.138 Similar principles also generally
apply, in tort law, where an individual exposes another person to a
special—or unusual—form of risk.139 Given the commitment to
equality under a CA, the position should also be no different where
children are concerned.
This kind of “insurance-based” understanding of children’s rights
also finds strong support, we suggest, in existing IHR and constitutional contexts. Article 3(2) of CROC, for example, explicitly provides that the duty of “states parties” is to “undertake to ensure the
child such protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being,
taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal
guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or her.”140
Similarly, Article 18 of CROC enshrines the principles that parents
and legal guardians “have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child,” and that the state’s role in this
context is to “render appropriate assistance to parents and legal

(noting the capacity of constitutional rights and judicial review to provide insurance to
outgoing political elites), with Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon, The South African Constitutional Court & An Insurance-Based Theory of Socio-Economic Rights (2011) (unpublished working paper) (on file with authors) (noting the capacity of socioeconomic rights
to provide political insurance to left-wing parties against the danger that certain concessions to right-wing parties, in the form of a right to property or contract, could prove
unduly costly downstream).
138
For an American example, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), in which
the Court held that “it is but just that the public be required to care for the prisoner, who
cannot by reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself.” (quoting Spicer v.
Williamson, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (N.C. 1926)). In some cases, however, the United States
Supreme Court has refused to apply this principle to children in their parents’ care. See,
e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago, 489 U.S. 189, 201–02 (1989). On the analogy between the
position of prisoners and children in this context, see further: NOLAN, CHILDREN’S SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 19.
139
For an Australian example, see Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159, 159 (Austl.)
(holding a solicitor liable to a third party who did not inherit due to solicitor’s negligence
in preparing a will, as solicitor owed third party a duty of care based on the nature of the
undertaking). For an English example, see Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman, [1990] 2 A.C.
(H.L.) 605 (appeal taken from Eng.) (holding that an auditor owed a duty to shareholders
and not just to client company, and finding that auditor was negligent in understating a
company’s financial losses). American examples can be found in the dramatic Tarasoff v.
Regents of the University of California, 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976) (holding that a therapist
owes a duty to the intended victim of a homicidal patient) and Rowland v. Christian, 443
P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968) (ruling that a property owner owes a duty to warn those on his
property about a concealed danger).
140
CROC, supra note 7, at art. 3(2).
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guardians in the performance of their child-rearing
responsibilities.”141
A similar form of insurance-based rationale can help explain the
result in cases such as TAC and SU-225/98. While the primary obligation to provide health care services to children, as the South African
Court noted in TAC, “rests on those parents who can afford to pay for
such services,” the state also has an obligation to provide access to
health care for children being cared for by their parents and families.142 This is also especially true, the Court suggested, in circumstances such as TAC, where parents are “for the most part indigent
and [thus] unable to gain access to private medical treatment which is
beyond their means.”143 A key reason for this, as the Colombian court
noted in SU-225/98, is also that, for children, poverty is almost always—and not simply often—beyond their control.144
B. A Cost-Effectiveness Principle
For many rights granted to children by IHR and national constitutions, considerations of cost will provide another potential justification for the grant of special priority to such rights, consistent with a
CA.
As noted above, social cost cannot be a trump, eclipsing the equal
entitlements of all persons under a CA: that is, the goal remains the
full empowerment of all individuals, and the focus is always, ultimately, on the individual rather than the total or average social
achievement.145 In this respect the CA differs from utilitarianism, as
well as from conceptions of development that equate development
with increased GDP per capita.146 From the perspective of a CA, it will
thus also generally be illegitimate for a state to assign special priority
to the rights of some individuals, over others, based on considerations
of marginal benefit. For children, the fact that they will generally live
longer than adults, and thus gain greater benefits from certain rights,
is thus insufficient to justify a claim on their part to any form of special
rights priority.
141

Id. at art. 18(1), 18(2).
Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign (No. 2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) at 749
para. 77 (S. Afr.).
143
Id. at 750 para. 79.
144
Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], mayo 20, 1998, M.P: E.
Cifuentes Muñoz, Sentencia SU-225/98 (Colom.), para. 31. (“La pobreza de los padres y
la falta de cobertura de los servicios públicos de salud, son para el niño variables que se
encuentran fuera de su control. Se descubre fácilmente que, en estas condiciones, el niño
a la vez que ignora su precariedad, objetivamente es un sujeto impotente ante un riesgo de
una magnitud incalculable.”).
145
See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
146
See NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 15, at 47–56, 69–100.
142
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This does not mean, however, that in a world of true resource
scarcity, considerations of cost will necessarily be irrelevant under a
CA. In some cases, the marginal cost of satisfying a rights claim will be
so low, relative to the large benefits involved to the individual, that any
denial of such a claim will in fact constitute a per se affront to a person’s dignity. A person denied access to a right in such circumstances
might well ask: “Why am I denied access to this right, given the minimal cost to others? Surely it is because others simply do not respect
me—or my life—as having full human value.” From the perspective
of a CA, such an answer is also deeply troubling: it suggests a clear
departure from Kantian ideas about human dignity, and universal respect for personhood.147 For children, it is also substantially more
likely than for adults that the marginal cost of protecting various
rights will fit this pattern of extreme disproportionality when compared to relevant benefits.
Take, for example, vaccines and the right to health as it applies to
children. For many life-threatening diseases, the cost of vaccinating
children will be extremely low. (Measles, for example, is a leading
cause of death among young children, but the vaccine costs just
nineteen cents per child.148) The effectiveness of vaccination will also
mean that, for most children, the benefits involved will be extremely
high—both when it comes to avoiding pain and suffering, and also
prolonging life-expectancy. In most cases, for the state to deny children access to vaccines, therefore, will be to send a clear message that
it does not value the inherent dignity of children, as it does for adults.
A similar principle also applies to other forms of preventive
health care, such as the kind of access to Nevirapine ordered by the
South African Constitutional Court inTAC.149 Each patient tested and
counseled for HIV clearly added some additional cost to the operation of government health clinics in South Africa. Such additional
costs, however, were likely very small relative to the fixed costs in147
See Dixon, supra note 102, at 400–01; Sandra Liebenberg, The Value of Human Dignity in Interpreting Socio-Economic Rights, 21 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 22 (2005). Unlike
Liebenberg, we do not believe that the denial of any rights-claim that is justified in
cost–benefit terms (that is, inherently reasonable and proportionate) will constitute an
affront to dignity in this sense. The polycentric nature of socioeconomic rights may mean
that, in cases where costs and benefits are relatively evenly balanced, it is reasonable to
deny even such reasonable demands, in order to realize more cost-effective protections in
other contexts. See Dixon, supra note 102, at 401. The same will not be true, however, in
cases of extreme disproportionality.
148
HELEN SAXENIAN, INTERNATIONAL AIDS VACCINE INITIATIVE/PROGRAM FOR APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY IN HEALTH, HPV VACCINE ADOPTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: COST AND
FINANCING ISSUES 10 (2007), available at http://www.rho.org/files/IAVI_PATH_HPV_
financing.pdf.
149
See Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign (No. 2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) at
765 (S. Afr.).
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volved in establishing a system of testing and counseling.150
Nevirapine itself was also being offered to the South African government free of charge at the time of the TAC case.151 For this reason,
the Court could also be extremely confident in predicting that “where
testing and counseling facilities” existed, Nevirapine could be provided by the government “within the available resources of the
state.”152
In some cases, preventive interventions by the state may be more
expensive, so that an extreme disproportionality principle no longer
applies. However, in many of these cases special priority for children’s rights may still be justified, under a cost-effectiveness principle,
because of the capacity of such rights to prevent a spiraling need for
state intervention to protect more and more capabilities.
In prior work on the CA, Wolff and De-Shalit have developed the
distinction between ordinary capabilities, and capabilities that are
more than usually “fertile” (for other capabilities for the same people,
and for the capabilities of other people).153 They have also distinguished between standard forms of disadvantage and those forms of
disadvantage that are particularly “corrosive” in terms of a CA—because of the likelihood that such disadvantage will cause other forms
of capability failure in the future.154 It will clearly also be legitimate,
under a CA, for the state to focus in the first instance on supporting
those forms of capability that are most fertile or eliminating those
forms of disadvantage that are most corrosive.
When the state is unable to realize its immediate duty to protect
capabilities under a CA, a CA urges choices that promote the maximal
realization of everyone’s capabilities in the future. By eliminating the
most acute forms of corrosive disadvantage in the present, a state also
directly increases its ability to meet this goal within the shortest possible time frame. A concern with cost-effectiveness is also itself just one
species of this more general point about fertility and corrosiveness: if
we can protect particular capabilities now in a way that reduces the
need for the state to support related capabilities in the future, in a
world of resource constraints we are more likely to achieve the full
realization of universal human capabilities in the near term.
Moreover, while the CA holds that determining “fertile” capabilities and corrosive disadvantages is a contextual matter, which may vary
with historical and economic circumstances, it is plausible to think
150

See id. at 743 para. 49.
See id. at 731 para. 11.
152
Id. at 749 para. 73.
153
See NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 15, at 44–45; WOLFF & DE-SHALIT,
supra note 23, at 121–22.
154
WOLFF & DE-SHALIT, supra note 23, at 121.
151
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that the protection of children’s capabilities will often be unusually
fertile, so that a limited priority for these capabilities will also frequently be justified, given a concern to avoid creating spiraling capabilities costs.155 Take children and the right of access to adequate
food and nutrition.156 For school-aged children, numerous studies
show a link between severe hunger and the development of various
chronic medical conditions.157 In other studies, severe hunger has
been associated with heightened forms of stress and mental illness in
later life.158 Such threats to physical and mental well-being are also
direct triggers, under a CA, of further obligations on the part of the
state. That is, where to begin with the state was only under a duty to
provide adequate nutrition, it will now be under a duty to provide
access to nutrition and adequate forms of medical treatment and psychiatric support.
By imposing a special duty on states to combat “malnutrition” for
children “through the provision of adequate nutritious foods and
clean drinking-water,”159 therefore, instruments such as CROC help
reduce potential spiraling costs to state parties of meeting universal
obligations to protect individual health, over the long term. A similar
analysis also applies to decisions, such as that of the Supreme Court of
India, which emphasize the importance of children’s access to adequate nutrition by ordering the provision of a nutritious midday meal
in all schools160 (a policy that had for some time worked well in Kerala
and Tamil Nadu).161
155
Cf. NOLAN, CHILDREN’S SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 14–15 (making
similar arguments in respect of certain socioeconomic rights for children, though not explicitly in reliance on the language of fertility and corrosiveness).
156
See, e.g., CROC, supra note 7, art. 24(2)(c) (noting the duty of states “[t]o combat
disease and malnutrition . . . through the provision of adequate nutritious food and clean
drinking-water,” as part of children’s right of access to health care).
157
Linda Weinreb et al., Hunger: Its Impact on Children’s Health and Mental Health, 110
PEDIATRICS 1, 4, tbl.1 (2002).
158
See, e.g., id. at 5 tbl.2.
159
CROC, supra note 7, Art 24(2)(c).
160
See People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No.
196 of 2001, http://www.righttofoodindia.org/orders/nov28.html (S.C. Nov. 28, 2001)
(India).
161
See V.A. GANGADHARAN, GOVERNMENT OF KERALA, NOON MEAL SCHEME IN KERALA:
NEW MANAGEMENT PROPOSAL FOR THE SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM 12 (2006) (“Kerala is a
pioneer in the introduction of the [Noon Meal] scheme in the country and compared to
many states, it has been a tremendous success here.”), available at http://www.righttofood
india.org/data/gangadharan2006keralanoonmealmanagement.doc; RIGHT TO FOOD CAMPAIGN—TAMIL NADU, INQUIRY REPORT INTO ACCIDENT AT MELVALAMPETTAI HIGHER SECONDARY S CHOOL 2 (2006), available at http://www.righttofoodindia.org/data/rtftn06
mdmaccidentenquiry.doc (“The Noon Meal Programme (NMP) has a long history in
Tamil Nadu and has become one of the most prestigious programmes of the state government. The Tamil Nadu scheme is the country’s largest in terms of the number of beneficiaries covered.”).

R

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\97-3\CRN303.txt

582

unknown

Seq: 34

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

9-MAR-12

13:52

[Vol. 97:549

A concern to avoid spiraling costs can also be used to explain the
special priority given to children’s right of access to education under
CROC and various national constitutions. Education, as Justice Brennan noted in Plyler v. Doe, “provides the basic tools by which individuals [are able to] lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us
all.”162 The quality of education individuals receive is also an important predictor of their likelihood of employment, and earnings, later
in life.163 We know, furthermore, that there are certain critical periods for cognitive development during which educational interventions are especially effective, and after which it may prove difficult or
even impossible to make up for lost time.164 For the state, this means
that giving special priority to children’s education can also provide an
extremely efficient means of fulfilling its responsibility to provide all
individuals with a minimum threshold level of control over their “material environment”—or ability to “seek employment on an equal basis
with others.”165
As Justice Powell implicitly noted, in Plyler, if the state invests in a
child’s basic preschool, primary, and secondary education, in many
cases it will have no need to expend further resources in order to
ensure that the child is guaranteed a minimum level of economic security and opportunity as an adult.166 Conversely, if it does not invest
heavily in the education of at-risk children, it will often need to invest
substantial resources in order to ensure such children even minimal
economic security, as adults, in a way that involves significant unnecessary social costs.167 By the time such children reach young adulthood,
basic forms of educational intervention will often have little impact on
162

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).
See, e.g., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL BRIEF:
MORE EDUCATION MEANS HIGHER CAREER EARNINGS (1994), available at http://
www.census.gov/apsd/www/statbrief/sb94_17.pdf.
164
See James J. Heckman, Skill Formation and the Economics of Investing in Disadvantaged
Children, 312 SCIENCE 1900, 1901 (2006) [hereinafter Heckman, Skill Formation]; James J.
Heckman, Op-Ed., Catch ’Em Young, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2006, at A14 [hereinafter
Heckman, Catch ’Em Young] (“Once a child falls behind in these fundamental skills, he is
likely to remain behind.”); Pedro Carneiro & James Heckman, Human Capital Policy 5–6,
45–49 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9495, 2003), available at http:/
/www.ecdgroup.com/pdfs/heckman_article-20_05_2003-17_59_04.pdf.
165
NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 15, at 32–34.
166
See Plyler, 405 U.S. at 221; see also Heckman, Skill Formation, supra note 164, at 1901;
Heckman, Catch ’Em Young, supra note 164; Carneiro & Heckman, supra note 164, at 45–53.
167
Justice Powell and Justice Brennan made similar points in their respective opinions
in Plyler. See Plyler, 405 U.S. at 241 (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that the consequence
of excluding illegal alien children from the public schools would be to create “within our
borders a subclass of illiterate persons many of whom will remain in the State, adding to
the problems and costs of both State and National Governments attendant upon unemployment, welfare, and crime”); see also id. at 221 (Brennan. J.) (majority opinion) (noting
that denying access to education creates “significant social costs borne by our Nation when
select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social
order rests”).
163
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their predicted earnings.168 For the state to guarantee them even
minimal economic security, therefore, it will often need to provide far
more resource-intensive forms of job-related training, social support,
or unemployment insurance. From this perspective, investing in a
child’s education will thus be a highly cost-effective means by which
the state can avoid the spiraling costs associated with needing separately to protect individuals’ capacity for control over their material
environment.
Alternatively, consider the state’s duty to help realize the capacity
of each individual to think and reason in an informed and independent way.169 One important predictor of an individual’s capacity to
learn such skills is their level of cognitive ability.170 All else equal,
those with lower cognitive abilities will place greater demands on the
resources of the state, in order to realize the minimum threshold level
of this capability. Cognitive abilities themselves, however, are also potentially malleable given appropriately targeted forms of educational
intervention.171 The earlier such intervention occurs, the more effective it is also likely to be.172 From this perspective, the state will also
clearly be justified in giving at least some priority to the education
rights of children, as compared to adults, or to the education of children with cognitive disabilities or other special needs.173 By taking
such action, a state can avoid not only the waste of human capital that
would result from not developing such children’s abilities at a critical
juncture,174 but also, the need in the future to provide far more costly
forms of support aimed at developing certain individuals’ cognitive
abilities.
168
See Heckman, Skill Formation, supra note 164, at 1901; Heckman, Catch ’Em Young,
supra note 164; Carneiro & Heckman, supra note 164, at 49–53.
169
Nussbaum defines the relevant capability as “[b]eing able to . . . think, and reason—and to do these things in . . . a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education.” See NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 15, at 33.
170
See Carneiro & Heckman, supra note 164, at 36 (demonstrating that both cognitive
and noncognitive skills play a major role in promoting educational attainment).
171
See, e.g., id. at tbl.6.
172
See James J. Heckman, Lessons from the Bell Curve, 103 J. POL. ECON. 1091, 1112
(1995); see also Carneiro & Heckman, supra note 164, at 30.
173
See CROC, supra note 7. In the United States, IDEA gives all children with disabilities rights to an education in accordance with an Individualized Education Plan. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C §§ 1400–82; see NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS, supra
note 15, at 203–11; Nussbaum, The Capabilities of People with Cognitive Disabilities, supra note
18 at 332, 341–45. The cases that prompted IDEA insisted that the state may not shirk its
constitutional responsibility to treat these children with equal respect simply because their
education is unusually costly. See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 996 (1984); Pa. Ass’n
for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 301–02 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
174
See Heckman, Skill Formation, supra note 164, at 1901–02 & fig. 2. See generally
Prabhat Patnaik, Affirmative Action and the “Efficiency Argument,” in EQUALISING ACCESS: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION (Zoya Hasan & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., forthcoming 2012).
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III
EXTENSIONS

AND

It is also important to note, however, that both these principles—
of special vulnerability and cost-effectiveness—have clear logical limits
from the perspective of a CA.
A. Limits
When it comes to a vulnerability principle, for example, an important component to a CA, as the Introduction and Part I note, is
that it recognizes human frailty and vulnerability as central parts of
the human condition for adults as well as for children. Thus, a CA
recognizes that parents themselves will often face tragic choices under
the CA: if they cannot provide for themselves, as well as their children,
they will have to make a tragic choice among competing capabilities.
A decent society will find ways to remove the need for parents to make
such choices.175 Unlike some other approaches to social justice (such
as many social contract theories), a CA also insists, in this context, that
we think of this responsibility in global, not simply local or national,
terms.176 For a child’s vulnerability to justify special forms of resourcepriority under a CA, therefore, that form of vulnerability must also be
one largely unique to the particular child, rather than shared by
adults (or parents) in the society more generally. If a reasonable, conscientious parent in a particular society could not be expected to provide a child with access to a particular good because of economic
scarcity, a child’s vulnerability to deprivation simply will not be the
result of the specific incapacity or unwillingness of their parent (or
guardian). Rather, their vulnerability will arise as a result of a general
economic insecurity that they share with these adults—so that they will
also be entitled only to the general forms of protection against deprivation enjoyed by such adults.177
In South Africa, the dispute over the scope of children’s rights of
access to shelter in Grootboom turned on exactly this distinction.178 In
the High Court, as Part I notes, Judge Davis gave strong priority to
175

See NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 15, at 36–39.
See NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS, supra note 15, at 274–75. This understanding also conforms to the legal position under many IHR treaties. See, e.g., ICESCR, supra note 6, art.
2(1) (requiring states “to take steps, individually and through international assistance and
co-operation, especially economic and technical” to realize the rights set out in the
Covenant).
177
See, e.g., supra notes 153–55 and accompanying text.
178
See generally NOLAN, CHILDREN’S SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 235–36;
Linda Stewart, Interpreting and Limiting the Basic Socio-Economic Rights of Children in Cases
Where They Overlap with the Socio-Economic Rights of Others, 24 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 472, 473
(2008) (exploring the seeming “overlap of different socio-economic rights (basic and qualified) in cases where the parents and their children claim to be entitled to socio-economic
rights”).
176
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children and their guardians, by requiring that the local authorities
provide basic shelter to all the child plaintiffs, where for the remaining adults, he provided only more abstract declaratory relief. The
Constitutional Court, by contrast, held that a child’s right to “shelter”
under Section 28 of the South African Constitution, and the more
general right of access to housing under Section 26, should be “read
together,” and denied any special relief to children.179 A clear justification for this finding by the Court (though the Court itself did not
cite such a justification) was also that adults generally did not enjoy
broad access to shelter of the relevant kind. In the Western Cape area
alone, as the Court noted in Grootboom, “[h]undreds of thousands of
people . . . occupied [only] rudimentary informal settlements providing for minimal shelter, but little else,” and were thus in desperate
need of housing.180 The average parent in the society was thus simply
not in a position to provide access to even basic adequate shelter to
their children, even when acting with maximum conscientiousness.
Because of this, it was also entirely reasonable for the Court to find
that Section 28 did not entitle children to any form of special priority
in the circumstances.
It is also important to note in this context that the emphasis
under a CA is on what the reasonable parent in a society can be expected to do to protect their children’s capabilities. It is not enough
under a CA to look at what the average parent in a society is willing to
do, because in many societies, parents may systematically neglect the
protection of certain capabilities for children, particularly girls.181
Where social norms define females as less worthy of full human development than males, the CA also insists unequivocally on the equal
worth of all human beings and the equal entitlement of all to access
relevant capabilities.182
This insistence on human equality does not make the CA “Western” or “imperialistic.”183 All nations have difficulty accepting and
supporting the full equality of women, and nations that have great
practical gaps between male and female have often given very strong
179
Gov’t of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), at 81–82, paras.
74, 76–79 (S. Afr.).
180
Id. at 55 para. 6.
181
Cf. NOLAN, CHILDREN’S SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 10 (“[S]ome commentators have gone so far as to argue that ‘adultism’—the oppression of children by
adults—has the same power dimension in children’s lives as sexism or racism.”).
182
See NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 15, at 1–11. Thus it is
not reasonable under a CA, for example, to deny girl children health care of the same
quality that boys would receive, to subject them to differential risks of sexual violence, to
exclude them from education, and to restrict their mobility in ways that impede learning
and the development of political participation. Id.
183
See NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 15, at 106–07.
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support to an ideal of human equality.184 India is an obvious case in
point. Discrimination on grounds of both gender and caste—even in
basic health care and education—remains extremely common.185
And yet the founding ideal of the nation, through the influence of
both Gandhi and Ambedkar, is one of full human equality and full
human empowerment.186 There is nothing at all foreign or colonial
about this goal.
When it comes to considerations of cost, or cost-effectiveness, a
CA likewise imposes two important limits on the application of such a
principle. One such limit is that it be applied with careful attention to
notions of fertility and corrosiveness.187 Not only are such concepts
now integral to a CA, as it has been developed by philosophers, but
they also help ensure that, in incorporating attention to considerations of cost, a CA retains its focus on the realization of each and every
one of the ten key human capabilities and not simply on more aggregate measures of wealth or well-being.188 The reason for this is that,
by definition, these notions depend on there being multiple, distinct
dimensions to a CA, and they thus highlight the complex goals of a
CA, as compared to the more homogenous aims of utilitarian approaches to social justice.189
A second important limit to a cost-effectiveness principle under a
CA is that it cannot be invoked in societies, such as the United States,
where resource constraints do not actually prevent the state from protecting the capabilities of all citizens, up to a basic minimum threshold, so as to violate the equal right of all citizens to protection of their
capabilities—even where the realization of particular capabilities may
be extremely expensive.
Take the right of children with cognitive disabilities to equal access to an education that can sustain and support the development of
capabilities such as practical reason and affiliation.190 From the perspective of a CA, it does not matter that it is often extremely expensive
to provide education of this kind. Notions of substantive equality
mean that, where education is likely to have real benefits for people
with cognitive disabilities, and the state resources exist, it is a moral
imperative to provide such education—regardless of the expense in184

See NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 15, at 24–25.
See NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 15, at 5–6; NUSSBAUM, WOMEN
AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 15, at 16 n.17, 26–28.
186
See NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 15, at 66, 105; NUSSBAUM, WOMEN
AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 15, at 39.
187
See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 15, at 44.
188
See, e.g., id. at 47–56 (identifying “aggregat[ion] across lives” as problematic components of GDP and Utilitarian development economic models).
189
See id. at 52; Nussbaum, Constitutions and Capabilities, supra note 3, at 18.
190
See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 996 (1984); Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v.
Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 301–02 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
185
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volved.191 The scope of IHR and many constitutional rights in this
area are also fully consistent with this understanding.
CROC, for example, requires states parties to ensure that disabled children “ha[ve] effective access to and receive[ ] education,
training, health care services, rehabilitation services, preparation for
employment and recreation opportunities in a manner conducive to
the child’s achieving the fullest possible . . . development.”192 Article
24(2) of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
likewise requires states to provide “[e]ffective individualized support
measures” for persons with disabilities in order to “maximize [their]
academic and social development,” in the context of the “the right of
persons with disabilities to education.”193
At a constitutional level, in Mills v. Board of Education,194 the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia likewise ruled in a manner
consistent with a CA. The court held that the exclusion of children
with cognitive disabilities from the District of Columbia public schools
could not be justified by pointing to the expense involved in educating these children. It is violative of the Due Process Clause to “deny[ ]
[children with cognitive disabilities] not just an equal publicly supported education, but all publicly supported education[,] while providing such education to other children.”195
B. Extensions
Providing these limits are borne in mind, however, we suggest
that both principles have the potential to have broad application, well
beyond the context of children’s rights.
Take a provision such as Section 27(3) of the South African Constitution, which provides that “[n]o one may be refused emergency
191
Cf. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS, supra note 15, at 202 (“In other words, the purpose of
social cooperation is not to gain an advantage; it is to foster the dignity and well-being of
each and every citizen. This goal is interpreted to mean that expenditures on poverty,
though they may be costly, are required by the very nature of our social commitment.” (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted)).
192
See CROC, supra note 7, at Art. 23(3).
193
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 611, U.N. GAOR,
61st Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/61/106 (Vol. 60.), at arts. 24(1), 24(2)(e); see also id.
at art. 7(1) (guaranteeing the right of children with disabilities “to be provided with disability and age-appropriate assistance” in order to realize the right “to express their views
freely on all matters affecting them”).
194
348 F. Supp 866, 875–76 (1972).
195
Id. at 875. “The Fifth Amendment, which is applicable in the District of Columbia,
does not contain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment, which
applies only to the states.” Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). Although “equal
protection of the laws” is not always interchangeable with “due process of law” there comes
a point at which “discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.”
Id. There is little doubt that this case would have been resolved in the same manner under
the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 500.
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medical treatment,”196 or provisions in various national constitutions,
including the South African Constitution, limiting the ability of states
to evict unlawful occupiers of property.197 Such provisions clearly give
some form of special priority to particular rights claimants, such as
those injured in an accident, or suffering some other kind of medical
emergency, or with existing access to informal housing. The more
general right to health care and housing in South Africa is simply a
right to “access” to health care services198 or housing,199 which the
state must take “reasonable . . . measures” progressively to realize,
“within its available resources.”200 Those without existing housing will
also generally have far less leverage in negotiating access to secure,
formal housing than those with a right to resist eviction. Such priority
also clearly makes sense, however, under a principle of extreme
disproportionality.
For a person seriously injured in an accident or suffering some
kind of temporary medical crisis, the benefits of being admitted to a
hospital for treatment are almost infinitely large: such emergency
treatment can literally save the person’s life. For a state hospital, by
contrast, if it has emergency room staff on duty and beds available, the
marginal cost of treating such a person will often be very low.201 This
gap—between marginal benefits, on the one hand, and marginal
costs, on the other—will also mean that, in most cases, denying emergency treatment to a person will carry with it a message fraught with
dignitary consequences.
If one starts with a concern about cost-effectiveness, it is also quite
clear why certain special forms of procedural protection ought to be
given to unlawful occupiers. Unlawful occupiers have generally built
informal housing structures that have some real economic value. The
destruction of such homes, therefore, would involve significant replacement costs for either the individual or the state. Giving individuals warning of their potential eviction can also often help avoid this
kind of destruction of economic value: either by allowing them the

196

S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, § 27(3).
Id. ch. 2, § 26(3) (“No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home
demolished, without an order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.”).
198
Id. at ch. 2, § 27(1)(a).
199
Id. at ch.2, § 26(1).
200
Id. at ch. 2, §§ 26(2); 27(2).
201
Where beds are not available, the risk of cross-infection created by putting such a
person on a trolley can mean that the marginal cost is longer in this same category (that is,
very low). See Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1996
S.C. 2426, at 2427–28, ¶ 5 (India).
197
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opportunity to reach a compromise with the property owner202 or by
giving them time to move basic building materials and possessions.203
Cost-effectiveness concerns can potentially go even further in justifying special protection for the rights of informal housing dwellers,
given a concern about spiraling capabilities costs. Housing is linked
to a form of capability—namely, control over the material environment—that is particularly fertile for the enjoyment of other capabilities.204 Adequate housing is generally a key precondition, for
example, for the enjoyment of bodily security; physical health, or protection from the elements; a sense of psychological security; sense of
community; and also access to employment.205 By protecting an individual’s access to such housing, therefore, the state can often indirectly promote a whole range of other key capabilities—including
bodily integrity, bodily health, life, emotion, affiliation, and (broader)
control over the material environment—whereas if it undermines
such access, it can create forms of corrosive disadvantage that call for
more and more intensive forms of intervention by the state.206
Take the circumstances in Tellis v. Bombay, decided by the Supreme Court of India.207 The petitioners were pavement-dwellers in
Bombay who had come to the city to seek work from areas of high
rural unemployment. For most petitioners, as the Supreme Court of
India noted, the ability to live on “a pavement or a slum in the vicinity
of their place of work” was also essential to their ability to find any
kind of work at all in Bombay—even work that simply provided “the
means of bare subsistence.”208 In most cases, if they chose to live further away, the time and expense of commuting to work would simply
be prohibitive and thus cause them to lose their job and means of
livelihood.209 Under a CA, given the duty of the state to ensure a min202
See, e.g., Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg
v. City of Johannesburg 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) at 217 para. 18 (S. Afr.).
203
Cf. Gov’t of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), at 84 para.
88 (S. Afr.) (explaining the unreasonableness of state action in which “respondents were
evicted a day early and to make matters worse, their possessions and building materials
were not merely removed, but destroyed, and burnt”).
204
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
205
See, e.g., Theresa C. Heintze et al., Housing Assistance and Employment: How Far-Reaching Are the Effects of Rental Subsidies?, 80 SOC. SERV. REV. 635, 663 (2006) (demonstrating that
low-income housing subsidies that created long-term housing leader to a greater likelihood
of employment and community involvement); supra note 37 and accompanying text.
206
See supra notes 153–55 and accompanying text.
207
Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp., (1985) 2 Supp. S.C.R. 51 (India), available at
www.escr-net.org/usr_doc/Decision.doc.
208
Id. at 62, 83.
209
Id. at 83 (noting that petitioners “choose a pavement or a slum in the vicinity of
their place of work, the time otherwise taken in commuting and its cost being forbidding
for their slender means).
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imum livelihood for all, this would also mean the state assuming responsibility for providing them access to some form of social welfare.
This does not mean, of course, that the state should never be able
to evict the occupants of informal housing. On the contrary, sometimes relocating pavement, or slum, dwellers will be essential to the
progressive realization of the state’s duty to provide access to adequate
housing—by allowing the state to upgrade housing within a particular
area.210 A concern about spiraling capabilities costs will, however,
mean when the state relocates people in this way, it will generally be
required to provide certain ancillary protections against the risk of
corrosive disadvantage—such as transportation allowing people to attend work, or access to new schools.211 As cases in South Africa such
as Residents of Joe Slovo Community v. Thubelisha Homes212 demonstrate,
this again creates a form of special priority for the occupants of existing informal housing, relative to those without any form of access to
housing.213
Special priority of this kind is also arguably justifiable under a CA
by reference to a vulnerability principle. The application of such a
principle will admittedly be somewhat more complex than a pure costeffectiveness principle in this context because on some level homeless
is always the product of legal regulation by the state. By establishing
and maintaining a system of private property, the state is in some
sense legally responsible for individual economic vulnerability: if adverse economic circumstances or shocks prevent a person from buying or renting land or housing, or using land to engage in acts of basic
subsistence, it is the law of property that prevents individuals from
simply using such land—without payment—to achieve this end.214
There is, however, an important difference in degree between such
cases and cases in which a court makes an order of eviction. The law
in cases of eviction is the direct and proximate cause of a person’s
homelessness; whereas in other cases, it is simply one of many poten-

210
This has been particularly true in South Africa, given the history of segregated
housing under apartheid. See, e.g., Vinothan Naidoo, Government Responses to Street Homelessness in South Africa, 27 DEV. S. AFR. 129, 134–36 (2010).
211
Cf. Nussbaum, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 15, at 145 (“The fertility of a
given capability, and the corrosiveness of a given capability failure, are empirical questions
whose answers are likely to vary with time and place and with the particular problems of
the disadvantaged group.”).
212
Residents of Joe Slovo Cmty. v. Thubelisha Homes 2010 (3) SA 454 (CC) (S. Afr.).
213
See id. at 493 para. 107 (noting that the “traumatic experience[ ]” of relocation was
“ameliorated by the State undertaking to provide transport and to ensure that schooling is
available to children, and that people . . . can get to work”).
214
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 70–74 (1993); Robert L. Hale,
Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 471–72
(1923).
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tial contributing factors. The two cases also differ in important respects in terms of individual agency.
When it comes to creating informal housing, for example, unlawful occupiers of land often show a great deal of entrepreneurship,
hard work, and tenacity in finding, or building, informal housing. In
many cases, they also combine this with political mobilization and advocacy in order to gain access to basic services such as running water,
garbage collection and basic sewerage.215 This is also exactly the kind
of individual agency that in the face of true resource (or housing)
scarcity the CA values.
While in building such housing, squatters are almost always disobeying the law, they are generally also doing so for good reason—
that is, that they have no realistic other way in which to secure even
life-preserving forms of minimal shelter for themselves and their families, over the short- to medium-term. In most cases, given the possibility of their eviction, they are also acting in a way that has only
temporary force. In effect, therefore, they are simply increasing the
long-term opportunities for the state to fulfill its duty, under a CA, to
provide universal access to both fully adequate housing and protection of private property (or control over a person’s material
environment).
CONCLUSION
In several respects, this Article leaves important questions unanswered. For one, the Article specifically avoids taking a final stance, in
a number of areas, on a number of “hard cases” involving children’s
rights.
A very complicated question that we have not fully analyzed, for
example, is the right to vote for children. We have argued that the
equal dignity of minors does not require giving them an equal right to
vote (and thus their case is asymmetrical with the case of adults with
cognitive disabilities). But we have not addressed the question
whether there might be more instrumental reasons, based upon the
need to gather information about children’s perceived interests, and
upon the need to take account of those interests in planning a future,
that might lead to granting older children a right to vote in some
limited and specific contexts.216
Similarly, in the area of sexuality, we have not addressed the difficult question of how to balance concern for children’s physical and
economic vulnerability with the need to respect agency. Although we
215
Witness the success of the Joe Slovo community outside of Cape Town in gaining
access to running water, portable toilets, electricity and street-numbering from the City of
Cape Town. See Slovo, 2010 (3) SA at 467, 472–74, 506, 514, paras. 21–22, 46, 156, 185.
216
See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
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would be opposed to granting young children rights of sexual consent, given their vulnerability to manipulation and abuse,217 and recognize that the state must adopt some kind of bright-line rule in this
area, we do not take a definite position on what the age of consent
ought to be. Nor do we address the question of how, even beyond the
age of consent, the special vulnerability of adolescents should be recognized by rape law, in cases involving teachers or other figures in
positions of authority. Current legal thinking about adult women has
recognized that respect for sexual agency is not incompatible with recognizing the extortionate character of some requests for sex in situations of asymmetrical power, and this problem is surely more acute
when the less powerful person is a child.218
In this area, as in others, we thus leave a significant amount to be
fleshed by national constitutional and legislative developments. It is a
general feature of the CA that central entitlements ought to be stated
in rather general and abstract terms, precisely in order to leave room
for the further specification of such entitlements in the light of a nation’s specific history and circumstances.219 When we are concerned
with children, as with adult women, we may need to look more critically at local customs and norms—because we are dealing with a class
of human beings that has too often been considered instrumentally,
as mere extensions of the will and goals of someone else, rather than
as ends in their own right.220 The need still remains, however, to
leave space for appropriate forms of democratic deliberation about
the precise content to be given to particular capabilities (or rights), in
light of relevant national circumstances.
When it comes to questions of special priority more generally, we
have likewise mapped out principles that, we hope, can serve as a useful beginning for thinking about such issues, by marking some paths
as unpromising or even deeply defective (the “innocence” idea), and
identifying more fruitful avenues of justification. Again, however, we
have left important details of these questions to be fleshed out in different contexts. In addition, we have suggested that the very issue of
special priority should remind us of the inherently tragic nature of
217
See Neerosh Mudaly & Chris Goddard, The Ethics of Involving Children Who Have Been
Abused in Child Abuse Research, 17 INT’L J. CHILD. RTS. 261, 263 (2009) (noting that children’s vulnerability is increased by their developmental needs, dependence on adults, “extrinsic social, cultural and environmental factors (which may include abuse) and intrinsic
factors which are inherent in the child (such as cognitive, emotional, sensory deficiencies,
physical defects and health issues)” (internal citation omitted)).
218
See generally STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION
AND THE FAILURE OF Law 168–205 (1998) (discussing the potential problems and consequences arising from sexual relationships characterized by asymmetrical power as with supervisors and subordinates or teachers and students).
219
See NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 15, at 108–09.
220
See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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certain choices under a CA. Tragic situations may require us to consider what to do in the immediate situation, but they also make us see
that the situation is profoundly defective, because, if we have analyzed
the options correctly, minimal justice cannot be achieved, and people
must be denied what they have a right to have.221 And the appeal to
special priority for children, we have suggested, should not be permitted to obscure this fact.
Above all, we hope to have shown that a focus on capabilities and
the intellectual architecture of the CA provides a useful framework for
the exploration of these urgently important issues. We now see that
children’s rights are, in fact, a “fourth frontier of justice” added to the
three areas already theorized by Nussbaum (rights of people with disabilities, rights across national boundaries, rights of nonhuman animals):222 that is, they are rights that are not adequately theorized by
existing social contract approaches, because such approaches, assuming a rough equality of physical and mental powers among the contracting parties, are not well equipped to theorize entitlements in
areas in which great differences of power exist. The special vulnerability of children means that they are not the “free, equal, and independent”223 agents of the social contract model. In their case as in
the three others mentioned, unusual vulnerability and powerlessness
demand a new approach to basic rights. The CA provides that
approach.

221
See NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 15, at 36–38; Nussbaum, The Costs
of Tragedy, supra note 27, at 187–92.
222
See NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS, supra note 15, at 14–22.
223
LOCKE, supra note 60, § 95.
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